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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the Tales from the Arabian Nights tells of a fisherman who
recovered a bottle with strange markings in his nets. When the fisher-
man pried off the top of the container, a huge genie came forth and
threatened him with death. The fisherman pointed out that he had
done the genie a favor by releasing him, but the genie replied that he
had vowed to kill the first person who opened the bottle. Finally, the
fisherman asked how so large and fearsome a creature could fit in such a
small space. The genie showed the skeptical fisherman how this was
done by dissolving into a cloud of smoke and shrinking until he was
small enough to fit back into the bottle. As soon as the genie was gone,
however, the clever fisherman quickly put the stopper back on the bottle
and threw it into the sea. Like the fisherman in the story, the United
States faces the same problem of putting a genie back into the bottle. In
this case, the genie is nuclear technology, particularly those aspects that
are closely related to the production of nuclear weapons.
The first effort at restricting the spread of nuclear technology oc-
curred shortly after World War II, 1 when the United States attempted
to keep its nuclear technology secret, and thereby prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons. 2 The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, how-
ever, rapidly developed nuclear capabilities, which demonstrated that
ultimately America's restrictive policies could not succeed. In order to
dissuade other nations from engaging in nuclear weapons research, the
United States initiated the Atoms for Peace program in 1953, under
which it agreed to share peaceful nuclear technology. 3 Pursuant to the
1. See Firmage, Anarchy or Order? The Nth Countv Problem and International Rule of Law, 29 Mo.
L. REV. 138, 142-44 (1964); Gilinsky, Plutonium, Prolifration and Polc, 79 TECH. REV. 58 (Feb.
1977); Pendley, Scheinman & Butler, nternational Safeguarding as fIuttinalied Collective Behavior, 29
INT'L ORGANIZATON 586, 590 (1975).
2. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (repealed 1954); Schein-
man, Security and Transnationall System, in TRANSNAT'L REL. AND WORLD POL. 276, 277-78 (R. Keo-
hane & J. Nye ed. 1972).
3. The Atoms for Peace Program may have also been intended to prevent the Soviet Union
from capturing the peaceful nuclear power market. Goldschmidt, A Histo'rcal Surve of Nonprolifera-
tion Polcies, 2 INT'L SECURrrY 69, 71 (Summer 1977).
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954,4 the United States entered into bilateral
agreements for cooperation, which included safeguards 5 to insure the
peaceful use of nuclear equipment and material.6 These arrangements
were later supplemented by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1968. 7 The Treaty required non-nuclear-weapons countries to subject
all their civilian nuclear facilities to safeguards, a provision known as
the "full scope" safeguards requirement.8
India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, however, undermined
America's confidence in existing safeguards arrangements, even though
no safeguards arrangement was violated by India.9 Thereafter, the
United States unilaterally sought to strengthen existing institutional
barriers to nuclear proliferation by requiring all countries, even those
that had not ratified the Treaty, to accept full-scope safeguards as a
condition of receiving nuclear equipment and material from the United
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976) (prior to amendment by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978).
5. Safeguards were based on a system of materials accountancy principles, supplemented by
physical inspections administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA
is an international agency affiliated with the United Nations and devoted to promoting the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy. See Szasz, International Atomiv Energy Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFE-
GUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73 (M. Willrich ed. 1973); Note, A SwVey of United Staes Treaties
and Agreements Involving the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 671, 688-89
(1978). For a discussion of IAEA safeguards see text accompanying notes 175-91 infa.
6. The United States presently has agreements with 28 countries as well as with Euratom
and the IAEA. Gleason, Nuclear Power at Home and Abroad. The Quest for a New Proliferation Poli, 11
CONN. L. REV. 512, 515 (1979). In 1962, the United States began to transfer responsibility for
administering safeguards to the IAEA. Willrich, Treaty on Non-roliferation of Nuclear Weapons.- Nu-
clear Technology Confronts World Polics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447, 1461 (1968). The resulting trilateral
safeguards agreements between the United States, the recipient, and the IAEA, have largely dis-
placed the older bilateral agreements. Kratzer, Nuclear Cooperation and Non-Proferation, 17 ATOM.
ENERGY L.J. 250, 276-81 (1976).
7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 (1970). See text accompanying notes 142-74 infa.
8. Id at art. 3 (1).
9. India exploded a 15-20 kiloton nuclear device on May 18, 1974 in a desert area about 40
miles from Pakistan. Note, Nuclear Proliferation.- Dim Prospectsfor Control, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57,
70 (1976). India obtained the plutonium for its bomb from an unsafeguarded research reactor
provided by Canada. Scoville, The Proliferation of Nuclear Reactors and Weapons, in TO AVOID CATAS-
TROPHE 63, 64-65 (M. Hamilton ed. 1977). Some of the heavy water used in the research reactor,
however, was supplied by the United States. Under the contract of sale for the heavy water, India
made promises of peaceful use. In 1971, the United States presented a diplomatic note to the
Indian Government stating that the use of U.S.-origin heavy water to fabricate material for an
explosive device would violate the peaceful use assurances. Goldschmidt & Kratzer, Peaceful Nu-
clear Relations: A Study of the Creation and Erosion of Confidence 32 (Working Paper of the
International Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy 1978); The Tarapur Nuclear Fuel Export Issue:
Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm on Cooenmental Affirs
,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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States. '0 India's use of civilian nuclear facilities to assist in the develop-
ment of its bomb also caused concern in the United States about latent,
as well as actual, nuclear proliferation."
No one denies that the spread of nuclear weapons seriously threatens
world peace. The risk increases as more and more countries construct
nuclear power plants, 12 particularly when they also acquire enrichment
and reprocessing facilities to obtain complete autonomy over their nu-
clear power programs. The current American effort to control the use of
sensitive nuclear technology is very much like trying to put the genie
back into the bottle. This article asserts that current U.S. efforts, like
the secrecy policy of the immediate postwar era, will eventually fail for
four reasons. First, it embodies a unilateral expression of American pol-
icy without sufficient power or moral authority to ensure the coopera-
tion of other countries. Second, it ignores both the energy concerns of
the industrialized countries and the technology aspirations of the Third
World. Third, it concentrates on restricting peaceful uses of sensitive
nuclear technology when the greater danger arises from facilities dedi-
cated exclusively to military purposes. Finally, American restrictions on
the use of sensitive, nuclear technology provide no response to the polit-
ical and military concerns that have led countries to desire nuclear
weapons in the first place. 13
The linkage between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and weapons
development is a complex one; therefore, this article presents both sensi-
10. Set Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2157(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). For a
discussion of the Act see text accompanying notes 210-58 inifa.
11. The term "latent proliferation" applies to those actions that fall short of actual diversion
of nuclear material from civilian facilities, but that facilitate a future decision to develop nuclear
weapons. T. GREENWOOD, H. FEIVESON & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: MOTIVA-
TIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 125-26 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Nu-
CLEAR PROLIFERATION]. Access to, and utilization of, certain technology and the nuclear material
produced therefrom, even when devoted solely to commercial uses, is a form of latent proliferation
because it permits a country to move closer to nuclear weapons capability without having to make
or acknowledge an explicit decision to do so. Neff & Jacoby, on-Aroliferation Siratle in a Changing
Nucear Fuel Ma/te, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 1123, 1126 (1979). Consequently, the United States has be-
gun to oppose the sale of uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities and technology to
third world countries and has even objected to the construction of these facilities in Europe and
Japan because they have direct potential for nuclear weapons production in addition to their use
for peaceful purposes. Id at 1132.
12. At the end of 1978 there were 209 nuclear power plants in operation worldwide with a
total capacity of 109,463 megawatts. 22 NUCLEAR NEWS 59 (Feb. 1979). According to one study,
world nuclear power capacity will reach 875,000 megawatts by 1990 and will exceed 2 million
megawatts by the year 2000. Most of these power plants will be constructed in the industrialized
countries, but developing nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan also will have significant nuclear power pro-
grams. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-E-46, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
SAFEGUARDS 244-45 (1977).
13. For discussion of these reasons see notes 259-303 ina and accompanying text.
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tive nuclear technology and the nature of nuclear proliferation in some
detail before proceeding to a critique of the current American policy.
Accordingly, Part II describes causes of proliferation, uranium enrich-
ment and fuel reprocessing technology, and nuclear proliferation path-
ways. Part III examines the international safeguards regime, including
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers'
Guidelines. Part IV summarizes the statutory basis for the current U.S.
policy, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, while Part V evalu-
ates this policy with respect to sensitive nuclear technology. Finally,
Part VI suggests a number of alternative approaches to reduce the risk
of nuclear weapons proliferation.
II. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: AN OVERVIEW
A. Causes of Nuclear Proliferation
There are various reasons why a country might decide to develop nu-
clear weapons, or at least to retain a nuclear option. The desire for en-
hanced prestige and political influence is one factor.' 4 A country can
enhance its position in the world through the acquisition of nuclear
weapons because status within the international community is largely
based on military power.' 5 In addition, economic considerations, such
as a desire for the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives,' 6 may per-
suade a country to acquire nuclear capability.' 7 National security, how-
ever, is the most important consideration in the development of nuclear
technology. Nuclear weapons provide a defense against nuclear attack,
as well as against aggression by conkventional forces.' 8 They also give
14. Comment, Prospects for Nuclear Prolferaton and Its Control, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
159, 175-77 (1976).
15. Scheinman, Political Implicattons of Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND Nu-
CLEAR INDUSTRY 224, 230-32 (M. Willrich ed. 1973). The French decision to develop nuclear
weapons reflected this sort of thinking. India and China also gained influence and prestige by
becoming nuclear powers. Epstein, The Prolferation of Nuclear Weapons, 232 SCIENTIFIC AM. 18, 22
Uan. 1975).
16. Comment, Prospctsfor Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
159, 177-83 (1976). Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) have been suggested for use in excavation,
stimulation of natural gas recovery, creation of underground caverns for oil and gas storage, and in
situ retorting of oil shale. Long, Peacefid Nuclear Erlsone, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 18, 21-26 (1976).
See also Knox, Nuclear Excavations: Thet, andApplcation, 7 NUCLEAR TECH. 189 (1969); Roncalio,
Plowshare - 4 Technology in Search of a Use, 16 ATOM. ENERGY Lj. 93 (1974).
17. The Third World countries that are committed to the creation of a new world economic
order may perceive retention of their nuclear option as a valuable bargaining chip in persuading
the rich industrial nations to agree to a more equitable distribution of the world's resources. Ep-
stein, Why States Co - and Don't Go - Nuclear, 430 ANNALS ACAD. POL SOC. SCI. 16, 23 (March
1977); R. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS 85 (1977).
18. W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION & ARMS CONTROL 29
(1976) [hereinafter cited as THE LAST CHANCE]; Note, Atomic Safeguards and the Strategy of Treay
Deterrence, 8 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 211, 219 (1975).
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smaller countries military superiority in their local regions. 19
As many as twenty-five countries now have the necessary technologi-
cal and economic resources to construct nuclear weapons. 20 Many of
these are industrialized countries allied with the United States or the
Soviet Union and are not likely to offend their nuclear allies or adversa-
ries by acquiring a nuclear capability.
2 1
Other near-nuclear countries constitute a more serious proliferation
risk. Most "high-risk" countries confront major external challenges to
their borders, to the legitimacy of their regimes, or even to their very
existence as independent states.22 Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Tai-
wan, South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina are among the leading
proliferation candidates. Most of these countries have refused to sign
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, therefore, are under no legal
duty to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.
23
Pakistan is no match for its rival, India, without nuclear weapons.
This was clearly demonstrated in 1971 when Pakistan was defeated and
forced to give up its eastern provinces, now Bangladesh. Although Paki-
stan's current civilian nuclear power program is miniscule, it recently
sought to purchase a reprocessing plant from France. Despite threats of
trade sanctions and an arms embargo from the United States, Pakistan
refused to cancel the contract. 24 When France suspended the agreement
in early 1978, pending the establishment of acceptable safeguard ar-
rangements,2 5 Pakistan secretly tried to acquire a uranium enrichment
19. Epstein, supra note 17, at 19.
20. Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany,
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland are currently capable of
developing nuclear weapons. Australia, Austria, Brazil, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Yugoslavia will have sufficient
technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons in 10 to 20 years. Scoville, The Proliferation of
Nuclear Reactors and Weapons, in To AVOID CATASTROPHE 63, 80 (M. Hamilton ed. 1977).
21. West Germany is prohibited by treaty from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Willrich,
West Germany's Pledge Not to Manufacture Nuclear Weapons, 7 VA.J. INT'L L. 91 (1966). West Germany
and other Western European countries, nevertheless, might go nuclear if the NATO alliance were
to collapse. Bunn, Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROS-
PECTS FOR CONTROL 29, 35-36 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970). On the other side of the Iron
Curtain, the Soviet Union, which supplies enriched uranium to its Eastern European allies, guards
against proliferation by requiring the return of all their spent fuel. Goldschmidt, A Historical Survey
of MonProliferation Polies, 2 INT'L SECURITY 69, 84 (Summer 1977).
22. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 11, at 83.
23. The only members of this group that have ratified the Treaty are Taiwan and South
Korea. Scoville, The Proliferation of Nuclear Reactors and Weapons, in To AVOID CATASTROPHE 63, 80
(M. Hamilton ed. 1977).
24. Walske, Nuclear Electr Power and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon States, I INT'L SECURITY
94, 100 (Winter 1977).
25. Franko, US Regulation of the Spread of Nuclear Technologies Through Supplier Power- Lever or
Boomerang?, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1181, 1198 (1978).
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plant. 26
Israel, the most technologically advanced of the high risk states, is
widely suspected of hijacking 200 tons of uranium ore in 1968, irradi-
ating it in the Dimona research reactor, and recovering the weapons
grade plutonium at a secret reprocessing plant in Beersheba. 27 The CIA
estimates that Israel may have ten to twenty nuclear weapons. 28 The
weapons are thought to be unassembled, 29 although one commentator
reported that some of them were assembled and readied for use during
the October 1973 War.30 Israel skillfully has used its cryptonuclear sta-
tus to intimidate its Arab adversaries without ever actually having ad-
mitted that it possessed nuclear weapons.
South Africa also is surrounded by hostile neighbors and is isolated
internationally. Like many other high risk states, it retained its nuclear
option by refusing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 3t Moreover,
like many Third World countries, South Africa wants to develop an in-
digenous nuclear power program that includes enrichment facilities and
other sensitive technology. 32 Recently, U.S. satellites detected an appar-
ent low-level nuclear explosion near South Africa. 33 If the blast were set
off by South Africa it would be especially disturbing, because South Af-
rica's open acquisition of nuclear weapons would probably induce other
countries in the region to embark on weapons programs of their own. In
fact, Nigeria's recent interest in nuclear power may be a response to
South Africa's apparent nuclear weapons capability. 34
The longstanding, though peaceful, rivalry between Brazil and Ar-
gentina is another potential proliferation threat, 35 and for this reason,
Brazil's massive reactor sales agreement with West Germany has caused
great concern. West Germany not only sold Brazil nuclear reactors, but
26. Khalilizad, Pakistan and the Bomb, 36 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 11, 13 (1980).
27. Note, TheJus Cogens Dmnensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 69 n.40
(1980). See also INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL - ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 305 U. Barton & L.
Weiler eds. 1976).
28. Scoville, The Proliferation of Nuclear Reactors and Weapons, in To AVOID CATASTROPHE 63,
65 (M. Hamilton ed. 1977).
29. THE LAST CHANCE, supra note 18, at 234; Bodansky & Schmidt, The Nuclear Alternatwe, 30
MERCER L. REV. 395, 419 (1979).
30. Falk, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation as a World Order toblem, I INT'L SECURITY 79, 80 (Win-
ter 1977).
31. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
32. See generally Greenwood, Rathjens & Ruina, Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation, ADEL-
PHI PAPER No. 130, 47-48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Weapons Proliferation].
33. Note, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 63, 79 n. 112
(1980).
34. Egan & Arungu-Olende, Nuclear Power/or the Third World? 82 TECH. REv. 46, 52 (May
1980).
35. Quester, Can Prolferation Be Stopped?, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 77, 85 (1974).
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promised to provide Brazil with a full range of nuclear fuel cycle facili-
ties, including a Becker uranium enrichment plant. 36 The agreement
calls for Brazilian participation in all phases of the project, including the
construction of reactors and the manufacture of components.37 Brazil
has agreed to accept IAEA safeguards over these facilities, 38 but it may
be able to build another plant once it has mastered the necessary engi-
neering and technological principles.3 9
If Brazil develops nuclear weapons, Argentina will almost certainly
follow.40 Argentina has based its civilian nuclear program on natural
uranium reactors in order to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers of
enriched uranium, but it remains interested in purchasing a gas centri-
fuge enrichment plant from West Germany.41 It also has a small
reprocessing plant and expects to construct its own heavy water produc-
tion plant as well. 42 Like Brazil, Argentina could easily replicate the
sensitive technology if it desired to manufacture nuclear weapons.
B. Sensitive Nuclear Technology
Enrichment and reprocessing are two "sensitive" phases of the nuclear
cycle 43 because each has the potential for providing material suitable for
36. Lopes, Atoms in the Developing Nations, 34 BULL. ATOM. ScI. 31, 33-34 (1978). See text
accompanying notes 62-65 thfra.
37. Gall, Atomsfor Brazil Dangersfor All, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 4, 5-6 (1976).
38. Lowrance, Nuclear Futures for Sale- Issues Raised By the West German - Brazihan Nuclear Agree-
ment, in INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 201, 209-11 (A.
Chayes & W.B. Lewis eds. 1977).
39. It should be noted, however, that the agreement provides that enrichment and reproces-
sing technology cannot be duplicated without IAEA safeguards being applied to the replication.
Comment, Prspects for Nuclear P/fration and Its Control, 6 DENVER J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y 159, 187
n. 114 (1976).
40. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 105 (1977).
41. Goulet, The Dynamics ofInternational Technology Flows, 80 TECH. REV. 32, 36 (May 1978).
42. Redick, Regional Nuclear Arms Control in Latin America, 29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 415, 418-19
(1975); K. LiSH, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 9 (1972).
43. To understand the connection between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the problem
of nuclear proliferation, one must understand the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear fuel cycle begins
with the mining and milling of uranium. The uranium is extracted by conventional or surface
mining techniques, and the uranium ore is crushed and chemically processed to extract and concen-
trate the uranium. K. LISH, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 9 (1972). The
resulting product, known as yellowcake, contains about 70% uranium oxide. Larson, International
Economic Implications of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 14 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 108, 110 (1972). It then is
converted into uranium hexafloride gas and shipped in canisters to an enrichment facility where
the concentration of fissile uranium-235 is increased to reactor grade. Note, Transportation of NuMclear
Material: The Public Calleng, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 63, 71 (1979). Current light water reactors are
designed to operate with a uranium-235 concentration of about 3%. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 152 (1977). At the fuel fabrication
plant, the enriched uranium hexafloride is converted into uranium dioxide powder and molded
into ceramic pellets. The fuel pellets then are sealed in long metal tubes, or "fuel rods." Each fuel
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the production of nuclear weapons. The enrichment phase of the nu-
clear fuel cycle is the critical step in the uranium pathway. Alterna-
tively, the reprocessing phase of the plutonium pathway poses the
greatest risk for the proliferation of weapons-grade material.
1. Uranium Enrichment
If it is to be used in conventional light water reactors, uranium must
be enriched by increasing the concentration of fissile uranium-235 iso-
topes44 prior to its fabrication into fuel pellets.45 To sustain a chain
reaction in a light water reactor, the concentration of uranium-235 in
the fuel must be raised from 0.7% to about 3%.46 In contrast, the concen-
tration of uranium-235 must be increased to 90% or more if the material
is to be used in nuclear weapons. 4 7
rod is approximately 12 feet long, one-half inch in diameter and contains hundreds of fuel pellets.
K. LISH, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 9 (1972). Finally, the fuel rods are
arranged into assemblies and sent to the nuclear power plant. The reactor core is constructed by
grouping fuel assemblies side by side in a cylindrical shape. Depending on the power level desired,
a reactor core may run from 9 to 11 feet in diameter and contain 30-40,000 fuel rods. Id. At the
power plant the uranium fuel is fissioned in a reactor. The resulting heat converts water into steam
that drives electric turbo-generators and produces electric power. Duderstadt, uctlear Power Conera-
lion 249, 253-57, repnnted in PERSPECTIVES ON ENERGY: ISSUES, IDEAS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DILEMMAS (2d ed. L. Ruedisili & M. Firebaugh eds. 1978). A typical 1000 megawatt plant requires
about 90 metric tons of uranium fuel, one-third of which must be replaced each year. Se. R. NA-
DER & J. ABBorTS, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 143 (1977); Ausness, High-Level Radioaaive
Waste Management- The Nut/ear Dimma, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 707, 742. After removal from the reac-
tor core, spent fuel assemblies are stored at the plant in water-cooled stainless-steel-lined pools to
allow radioactivity levels to decline. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR ENERGY'S DI-
LEMMA: DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTE SAFELY 52 (1977). Eventually, the
spent fuel will either be recycled or buried deep underground for permanent disposal. Ausness,
High-Level Radioactive Waste Management. The Nutear Dilemma, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 707, 735-51; Jak-
setic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive Hik'h-Leoel Waste Management, 9 ENVT'L L. 347, 348-61 (1979).
44. Fissile isotopes are those which can be fissioned by neutrons of all speeds. Nonfissile iso-
topes, such as uranium-238, cannot sustain a chain reaction where neutrons of all speeds are pres-
ent. Natural uranium ore contains only about 0.7% fissile uranium-235; the remainder is non-fissile
uranium-238. Weapor Prolferattion, supra note 32, at 3, 5.
45. Conventional nuclear reactors use ordinary or "light" water to moderate or slow down
neutrons that are produced by the chain reaction. However, a heavy water reactor, such as Ca-
nada's CANDU nuclear reactor, uses deuterium oxide or "heavy" water as a moderator. McIntyre,
Natural Uranium Heay-Wzater Reactors, 233 SCIENTIFIC AM. 17, 19-20 (1975). Heavy water reactors
do not need to shut down for refueling. G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLITICS 47
(1979). CANDU reactors use natural uranium and, therefore, do not provide an inducement to
acquire uranium enrichment facilities. Stanford, Nt/ear Assitance and Cooperation Agreements. Some
Prolems in the Application of Safeguards, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 437, 441 (1975). On the other hand,
this characteristic would allow a country to produce plutonium without subjecting itself to the
economic burden of frequent shutdowns to replace fuel. Goldschmidt, A Hitonical Surey of Non-
proliferation Polcin, 2 INT'L SECURITY 69, 73 (Summer 1977).
46. Larson, International Economic Implicatioms of the Nut/ear Fuel Cyc/e, 14 ATOM. ENERGY L.J.
108, 112-13 (1972).
47. Krass, Laser Enni'ment of Uranium. The Proliferation Conrntion, 196 ScI. 721, 722 (1977). A
less efficient nuclear explosive of practical weight, however, can be constructed with the following
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 16
a. Gas Diffusion
Most uranium enrichment plants use the gas diffusion process.48 In
each gas diffusion stage, uranium hexafluoride gas is pumped under
pressure through a porous nickel barrier tube, which causes the lighter
gas molecules containing uranium-235 to pass through the barrier more
rapidly than those containing uranium-238. The gas that has passed
through the tube is then pumped to the next stage, while the gas re-
maining in the tube is returned to lower stages for recycling. 49
In each stage, the concentration of uranium-235 is increased only
slightly; therefore, enrichment to reactor grade requires a cascade of ap-
proximately 1200 stages.50 Consequently, gas diffusion plants are large
and expensive.5' They also use huge amounts of electric power 52 and
millions of gallons of water daily for cooling purposes. 53
The United States currently operates three gas diffusion plants with a
total capacity of 17.23 million separative work units (SWUs). 54 These
thresholds for uranium-235, uranium-233, and plutonium mixed with uranium-238: 20% concen-
tration of uranium-235, 12% concentration of uranium-233, 12% concentration of plutonium-239,
and 14% concentration of reactor grade plutonium. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 143 (1977).
48. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-
GUARDS 179 (1977).
49. Glackin, The Dangerous Drift in Uranium Enrichment, 32 BULL. ATOM. ScL 22, 26 (1976).
The depleted gas, containing about 99.8% uranium-238, is condensed to a solid and placed in large
steel drums. There are now more than 20,000 of these drums in storage in the United States, each
of which holds about 9 tons of uranium. Pollard, Energy and the Conquest of Fear, in To AVOID
CATASTROPHE 83, 85 (M. Hamilton ed. 1977).
50. More than 4000 stages are needed to produce weapons grade uranium. Casper, Laser
Enrchment." A New Path to Proliferation?, 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 28, 30 (1977).
51. The plants, which may be one-half mile long and cover 60 acres, cost as much as $3
billion to construct and require $500 million per year to operate. Zare, Laser Separation of Isotopes,
236 SCIENTIFIC AM. 86, 98 (1977).
52. The three U.S. enrichment facilities require 6000 megawatts of power at peak production.
Gillette, Uranium Enrichment." Rumors of Israeli Progress With Lasers, 183 ScI. 1172, 1172-73 (1974).
53. For example, the 7.3 million SWU-plant at Paducah, Kentucky requires 400 million gal-
lons of water per day for cooling purposes. Boskma, Uranium Enrichment Technologies and the Demand
for Ennched Uranium in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS 56, 60 (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute ed. 1974). SWU stands for separative work unit; it is a measure of the
amount of energy expended to recover uranium-235 from natural uranium (in the form of uranium
hexafluoride gas). The more SWUs expended, the more uranium-235 can be extracted from a
given quantity of natural uranium. Jacoby, Uranium Dependence and the Proliferation Problem, 79
TECH. REV. 18, 25 (June 1977). It requires about 3.425 SWUs per kilogram of product to enrich
the concentration of uranium-235 from 0.71% to 3% if the depleted uranium (or "tails") contain
0.3% uranium-235. NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER: ISSUES AND
CHOICES 365 note a (1977) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES AND CHOICES.]. A 1000 megawatt power
plant operating at 65% of capacity would require about 100,000 SWUs per year of enrichment
services. Weapons Proliferation, supra note 32, at 21.
54. For a definition of separative work units see note 53 supra. The three plants' total capacity
is presently 17.23 million SWUs. The Oak Ridge, Tennessee Plant is 4.73 million SWUs, the Padu-
cah, Kentucky Plant is 7.31 million SWUs and the facility at Portsmouth, Ohio is 5.19 million
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plants were originally constructed to produce high-enriched uranium for
the nation's weapons program, but they now serve the needs of the civil-
ian nuclear power industry.55
b. The Gas Centrifuge Process
The gas centrifuge process only recently has been introduced into
commercial use. The United States, for example, is planning to locate a
gas centrifuge plant near the gas diffusion facility in Portsmouth,
Ohio.5 6 This technique forces uranium hexafluoride gas through a series
of rapidly spinning cylinders or centrifuges. The heavier uranium-238
molecules are forced to the sides of the cylinder, while the lighter ura-
nium-235 molecules gravitate toward the center.5 7 The gas in the center
is removed and transferred to another centrifuge where the process is
repeated. As it moves through a succession of centrifuges, the gas be-
comes progressively richer in uranium-235 isotopes.5 8
The gas centrifuge process, like gas diffusion, is incremental, and
therefore large numbers of centrifuges are needed to enrich the uranium
to reactor grade.5 9 Gas centrifuge plants, however, consume only 4% of
the electricity required for gas diffusion plants. 60 By using gas cen-
trifuges, a smaller plant is commercially more feasible than with the gas
SWUs. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1977). The USSR has a
9 million SWU gas diffusion plant in Siberia. Duffy, Sovit Nuclear Exports, 3 INT'L SECURITY 83,
104 (Summer 1974). Eurodif, a European consortium, is constructing a plant with a 10.8 million
SWU capacity at Tricastin, France. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra, at 171; Rippon,
Eurodif Starts Production, 22 NUCLEAR NEWS 62 (May 1979).
55. Glackin, supra note 49, at 27.
56. The U.S. plant is expected to begin operation in 1988. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AN EVALUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION STRAT-
EGY 29, ID-77-53, (Oct. 1977). THE LAST CHANCE, supra note 18, at 40. At the present time
Urenco, an organization representing English, German, and Dutch interests, has constructed two
small 200,000-SWU gas centrifuge enrichment pilot plants in Capenhurst, England and Almelo,
Holland. Casper, Laser Enrthment. A New Path to Proliferation 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 8, 41 (Jan.
1977). Urenco also expects to build a larger 2 million SWU plant in the near future. U.S. OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 179-80 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS].
57. Gilinsky, Milta,7 Potential of Civilian Nuclear Power, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROS-
PECTS FOR CONTROL 41, 45 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
58. Beckman, Gas Centrifugesfor Cheaper Isotope Separation, in PUGWASH SYMPOSIUM, PREVENT'
ING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 90 (C. Barnaby ed. 1969).
59. While 9 to 10 million SWU appears to be the preferred size for gaseous diffusion plants,
centifuge plants on the order of 2 to 3 million SWUs would be feasible. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra
note 53, at 371. According to one estimate, a 1.3 million SWU plant, large enough to service ten
1000 megawatt plants, would require about 200,000 centrifuges. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
SAFEGUARDS, supra note 56, at 155.
60. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 33, ID-77-53 (Oct. 1977).
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diffusion process.6 1
c. The Becker Process
A third enrichment technique, known as the Becker process, separates
uranium isotopes aerodynamically. 62 A mixture of uranium hexafluo-
ride and hydrogen gas is forced into the space between a pair of blades
and a semicircular groove. Centrifugal force and pressure concentrate
the uranium-238 isotopes along the surface of the groove, moving them
behind the second blade, while the lighter gas, containing uranium-235,
collects near the center of the curvature between the two blades.63 Al-
though the efficiency of the process varies at each stage with the concen-
tration of uranium hexafluoride, in general, fewer stages are needed
with the Becker process to produce reactor grade enriched uranium than
with the gas diffusion method.6 The Becker process, however, requires
more than twice as much energy as gas diffusion, thus limiting its com-
mercial use to areas where large sources of inexpensive electric power
are available.65
d. Laser Enrichment Techniques
Scientists in Australia, Germany, Israel, and the United States also
are experimenting with lasers as a means of separating uranium iso-
topes.66 Although much of this research is highly classified, 67 some in-
formation on the two most promising techniques has appeared in non-
classified sources. In one process, uranium metal is vaporized and sub-
jected to a laser beam at a wave length that excites only uranium-235
atoms. The vapor then is exposed to a second laser beam that ionizes
the uranium-235 atoms, but not the unexcited uranium-238 atoms. Fi-
nally, an electric field sweeps the uranium-235 atoms into a collecting
61. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFGEGUARDS supra note 56, at 179-80.
62. Weapons Prolferatzon, supra note 26, at 47-48.
63. Id
64. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS supra note 56, at 179.
65. Glackin, The Dangerous Dlnfl in Uranium Ermchrnt, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 22, 22 (Feb.
1976). A small 10-stage pilot plant at Karlsruhe, Germany has been operating at full-scale capacity
since 1967. Boskma, Uranium Ennchmeni Tc/mnologis and the Denandfor Enniched Uranium in STOCK-
HOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS 56,
61 (1974). Germany has contracted to supply Brazil with a Becker process enrichment plant as part
of their large reactor sale agreement. Gall, Atonsfor Braril, Dangers for All, 32 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 4, 6
(1976). South Africa is also reportedly working on an aerodynamic isotope separation method
similar to the Becker process. THE LAST CHANCE, supra note 18, at 40. A small pilot enrichment
plant is already operational and a 5 million SWU capacity facility is planned for South Africa in
the mid-1980's. Weapons Prolferation, supra note 32, at 48.
66. Gillette, Uranium Enricment Rwnors of Israeli Progress with Lasers, 183 Sci. 1172, 1173
(1974).
67. Krass, Laser Enrichmtnent of Uranin: The Prfiferation Connection, 196 ScI. 721, 730 (1977).
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plate.6 In the second method, molecules of uranium hexafluoride gas
are exposed to infrared laser light. The uranium-235 atoms absorb the
light, which causes an increase in their energy state. An ultra-violet la-
ser then can be used to break up these molecules, separating the ura-
nium-235. The uranium-235 also may be recovered by means of a
photochemical reaction. 69
Fully developed laser enrichment techniques will probably require no
more energy than the gas centrifuge method. 70 Many technical and en-
gineering obstacles, however, must be overcome before laser enrichment
will be perfected and commercially available.7' If it becomes widely
available, however, laser enrichment technology will greatly increase the
risk of nuclear proliferation because unlike other forms of enrichment,
the laser method does not require multiple stages. It is a "single-shot"
rather than an incremental process, thereby producing a small quantity
of almost pure uranium-235 with each operation.7 2 Consequently, it is
especially well suited for small-scale, clandestine production of material
for nuclear weapons. 73
2. Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Spent fuel reprocessing is another sensitive aspect of the nuclear fuel
cycle, and it is an essential step in the nuclear fuel recycling process. 74
Plutonium produced in nuclear power reactors is trapped inside the
spent fuel along with a variety of highly radioactive fission products.
Reprocessing operations, therefore, are necessary to separate the pluto-
68. Casper, Laser Enrihment: A New Path to Proliferation? 33 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 28, 31 (Jan.
1976).
69. Id at 32-34.
70. Gillette, supra note 66, at 1173.
71. Glackin, The DOangerous Dift tn Uranium Enrchment, 32 BULL. ATOM. ScL 22, 25 (Feb.
1976).
72. Scoville, The Prolferation ofNuclear Reactors and Weapons, in To AVOID CATASTROPHE 63,
71 (M. Hamilton ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Scoville].
73. Krass, supra note 67, at 721.
74. Pliitonium-239 is formed when neutrons released during the nuclear chain reaction are
absorbed by uranium-238 in the reactor's fuel elements. Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Industry in IN-
TERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 45, 47 (M. Willrich ed. 1973); Gilinky, Mii-
tary Potential of Civilian Nuclear Power in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 41,
44 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich ed. 1970). Slow moving neutrons are captured by uranium-238 atoms,
which are then transformed into uranium-239. Uranium-239 is unstable with a half-life of about 23
minutes. It decays into neptunium-239. This substance, however, is also unstable, having a half-
life of 2.3 days, and it decays into plutonium-239. Comment, Policing Plutonium.. The Civil Liberties
Fallout, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 376, n.37 (1975). Plutonium-239, is fissile and, therefore,
may be used as reactor fuel or as nuclear weapons material. In fact, about 50 percent of the energy
produced by a conventional light water reactor comes from the fission of plutonium formed in the
uranium fuel. Eschbach, Some Plutonium Recycle Program Fuel Cycle Having Reduced Prolferation Charac-
teristics, 41 NUCLEAR TECH. 168, 169 (1978).
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nium from the other fission products and recover it for use as reactor
fuel. 75
Commercial reprocessing plants are technically complex and expen-
sive to build.76 The high cost is due in part to the fact that a good deal
of shielding is required and many critical operations must be done by
remote control because of the high radoactivity level of the spent fuel.7 7
The process used in commercial reprocessing plants is solvent extraction.
The first step, or "headend step", in the process is to remove the struc-
tural components of the fuel assemblies and chop the fuel elements into
short sections.78  Next, the pieces are placed in a nitric acid solution to
dissolve the uranium oxide fuel pellets. 79 The acid solution is cen-
trifuged to remove undissolved solids and is then chemically treated for
the separation process.
In the separation process, the solution is then fed into an extraction
column, mixed with organic solvent, tributyl phosphate (TBP), and
then dissolved in a kerosene-like hydrocarbon. This causes the pluto-
nium and uranium to dissolve in the solvent, while the fission products
remain in the nitric acid solution.8a The solvent, now containing all of
the uranium and plutonium, is removed from the top of the first column
and is fed into a second or partitioning column where it flows upward
and mixes with a reducing agent in an aqueous solution. The pluto-
nium washes out of the organic solvent into the aqueous solution and
continues down, leaving through the bottom of the column. The pluto-
nium recovered is in the form of a nitrate solution, but is converted into
solid form before shipment."' The uranium remaining in the solution
continues on to a third, or stripping column.8 2 Water is added through
75. Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy - Overview of the Major Issues, Subcomm. on Energy and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1975) (state-
ment ofJ. Liverman).
76. A plant capable of reprocessing 1500 metric tons of spent fuel a year would cost between
$500 and $800 million to construct. Greenwood, Rathjens & Ruina, Nuclear Power and Weapons
Proliferation in ADELPHI PAPERS No. 130, at 19 (1976).
77. Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Indust, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR IN-
DUSTRY 45, 53 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
78. Jasani, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS 89, 90-91 (1974); Extent and St'gnifwance of the Im-
pact on Reactor Licensing of Recent Court Decisions, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 337 (1976).
79. Fission product gases released in the chopper and dissolver stages are removed and
treated in an off-gas system, while fuel cladding and other solid fuel assembly components are
washed and sent to storage. Hatcher & Morgan, Technical and Economic Considerations in Fuel Reproces-
sing in INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 33, 36-38 (A.
Chayes & W.B. Lewis eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Hatcher & Morgan].
80. Bebbington, The Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels, 235 SCIENTIFIC AM. 30, 32-33 (Dec. 1976).
81. Metz, Reprocessing: How Necessary Is It for the Near Term? 196 Scl. 43, 44 (1977).
82. Hatcher & Morgan, supra note 79, at 40.
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the top of the column and washes the uranium out of the solvent. The
solvent then is sent through a solvent recovery system for cleanup and is
reused. 83 The uranium leaves through the bottom of the column in an
aqueous solution of uranium nitrate. The uranium that is recovered,
however, contains only slightly more uranium-235 than natural ura-
nium, and it must be returned to an enrichment plant before reuse.84
If a fuel recycling policy is adopted, plutonium recovered from spent
fuel will be combined with enriched uranium to make mixed oxide fuel.
The fuel produced will be in the form of ceramic pellets, as is presently
done in the case of low-enriched uranium fuel. Mixed oxide fuel rods
can be arranged in separate fuel assemblies, or single assemblies may
contain islands of mixed oxide fuel rods surrounded by fuel rods con-
taining low-enriched uranium.8 5 Thus, the potential energy advantages
of recycling spent fuel are enormous.8 6
Reprocessing also is essential to the operation of breeder reactors.8 7
The breeder concept closest to commercial development is the liquid
metal fast breeder reactor.88 The core of a 1000 megawatt plant would
contain about 2500 kilograms of plutonium.8 9 The breeder reactor's
most attractive feature is its ability to produce more fuel than it uses.
Breeding occurs when heavy nuclei, such as uranium-235 or plutonium-
83. Id at 40. The recovered uranium and plutonium are each subjected to additional extrac-
tion and stripping cycles for further purification.
84. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-
GUARDS 23 (1977).
85. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FI-
NAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON THE USE OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM IN MIXED
OXIDE FUEL IN LIGHT WATER COOLED REACTORS: HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENVIRONMENT III D-7,
NUREG-0002 (Aug. 1976) [hereinafter cited as GESMO].
86. Each year a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor produces about 230 kilograms of plutonium.
Scoville, supra note 72, at 73. The fission of one gram of plutonium produces the same amount of
heat as the combustion of more than three tons of coal or 700 gallons on fuel oil. Willrich, World-
wide Nuclear Industry, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 45, 46 (M.
Willrich ed. 1973). A 1,500 metric-ton capacity reprocessing plant, which could service 50 such
reactors, could recover the energy equivalent of 290 million barrels of oil per year. Futter, The Cue
for Multinational Reprocessing Centers - Now, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 430, 436-37 (1977).
87. Great Britain and France intend to store the plutonium recovered from spent fuel for
future use in breeder reactors. Wolfe, Could Ameria's Nucear Polcies Be Counterproductive?, 36 BULL.
ATOM. Sci. 43, 45-6 (Jan. 1980).
88. In a liquid metal fast breeder reactor, fuel pellets of mixed plutonium oxide and uranium
oxide are contained in stainless steel rods or "pins", which are about 1/ inch in diameter and about
2 feet long. Several fuel pins are attached to each other, end-to-end, and to additional pins, that
contain only uranium oxide at the top and bottom. Approximately 100 pins are placed together in
a fuel assembly and 500 fuel assemblies (or 50,000 pins) make up the core of a 1000 megawatt plant.
Vendryes, Superphenix: A Full-Scale Breeder Reactor, 236 SCIENTIFIC Am. 26 (March 1977); Seabors &
Bloom, Fast Breeder Reactors, 223 SCIENTIFIC AM. 13 (Nov. 1970). Liquid sodium is used as a moder-
ator and coolant in the process because it can transfer heat well, but does not inhibit fast fission. R.
NADER & J. ABBOTTS, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 49 (1977).
89. Chow, The Economic Issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor Program, 195 Sci. 551, 551 (1977).
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239, undergoing fission, produce more neutrons than are needed to sus-
tain the chain reaction. The extra neutrons are absorbed by fertile U-
238 nuclei and transformed into plutonium.90 With the commercializa-
tion of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, the prospect of energy self-
sufficiency may become a realistic one for the industrialized nations.
The future of commercial reprocessing and breeder reactors in the
United States is clouded by the nuclear proliferation controversy. Al-
though the United States has reprocessed spent fuel from military pluto-
nium production reactors since World War II, the only commercial
plant to operate in this country has been closed since 1972.4 l The long
awaited "plutonium economy" seemed about to begin, however, when
construction of a 1500 metric-ton capacity reprocessing plant began in
Barnwell, South Carolina. In response to the anticipated demand for
mixed oxide fuel, the Atomic Energy Commission proposed to issue
licenses for commercial use of recycled fuel. 92 The agency, issued a ge-
neric environmental impact statement (GESMO)93 on the proposed ac-
tion, but failed to examine the required non-nuclear alternatives to
recycling and to discuss the problem of protecting nuclear plants and
material from sabotage or diversion by terrorists. The Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, the AEC's successor, agreed to produce a supplemen-
tal impact statement and issue "interim" licenses while the study was
being completed.94 A federal court of appeals, however, determined
that the interim licensing proposal was improper. 95
During the 1976 Presidential Campaign, President Ford announced a
new nonproliferation policy, which included the deferral of commercial
spent fuel reprocessing.96 Following the election, the Carter administra-
tion, also fearful of the proliferation dangers of reprocessing, abruptly
withdrew its support for spent fuel recycling. 97 The GESMO hearings
were terminated and construction on the Barnwell facility came to a
90. Vendryes, Superphenix. A Full Sale Breeder Reactor, 236 SCIENTIFIC AM. 26, 31 (March
1977).
91. This is the Nuclear Fuel Services plant located in West Valley, New York. Ausness, High-
Level Radioactive Waste Management: The Nuclear Dilemma, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 707, 736. Most of the
spent fuel reprocessed by the plant came from military plutonium production reactors rather than
from civilian power plants. G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND PoLrrIcs 71 (1979). Six hun-
dred thousand gallons of liquid high-level radioactive waste is still stored at the site. Lester & Rose,
The Nuclear Wastes at West Vally, New York, 79 TECH. REV. 20 (May 1977).
92. 39 Fed. Reg. 5,356 (1974).
93. See note 85 supra.
94. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,056 (1975).
95. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 539 F.2d 824
(2d Cir. 1976).
96. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 3-4 (Sept.
1980) (ID-80-42).
97. Shea, New Nuclear Policy Under the National Energy Plan, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 689, 701 (1977).
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halt.98 Although the United States has presently discontinued commer-
cial fuel reprocessing, a number of European countries are constructing
or operating large reprocessing facilities. 99
C. Nuclear Proliferation Pathways
There are numerous ways in which countries and subnational groups
may obtain nuclear weapons or nuclear material. Seizure of another
country's weapons or purchase of such weapons are two possible routes.
Seizure by the host country of nuclear weapons on its soil, however, is
highly unlikely because the political repercussions would be severe.' 0
Such a situation might arise where, as in Iran, a friendly government is
overthrown and replaced by one that is intensely hostile to its former
ally. Purchase of nuclear weapons, either from another country,
criminals, or terrorists, is another unlikely, but possible, method of ac-
quiring nuclear weapons. For example, Libya's Colonel Qaddafi appar-
ently attempted to purchase nuclear weapons from China in 1970.101
Terrorism, clandestine diversion of nuclear material from civilian facili-
ties, and production of nuclear material from dedicated facilities are the
most likely nuclear proliferation pathways.
1. Terrorism
Virtually no area of the world is free from terrorist activity. Further-
more, the number of terrorist and revolutionary groups seems destined
to increase as social and political instability grows in the world. Conse-
98. 2 Nuclear Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,051 (1977). The NRC, after considering the President's
views, formally terminated the GESMO hearings on December 23, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,334
(1977), along with proceedings on virtually all pending and future recycle-related license applica-
tions. 2 Nuclear Reg. Rep. (CCH) 30,296 (1978). President Carter also expressed opposition to
early commercialization of the breeder reactor and sought to cut off funds for America's Clinch
River breeder reactor. Nye, Proliferation: a Log-Term Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 618 (1978).
99. More than a dozen other countries have access to reprocessing technology. Weiss, Nuclear
Safeguards.- A Congressional Perspective, 34 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 27, 30 (March 1978). In Great Britain,
the Windscale plant, operated by a government-owned corporation, British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd.,
can reprocess 2000 metric tons of spent fuel per year. Babbington, The Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels,
235 SCIENTIFIC AM. 30, 35 (Dec. 1976). France operates reprocessing plants at Marcoule and La
Hague. Id at 39. Germany has a small plant at Karlsruhe and is planning to construct a larger
plant in the near future. G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLTICS 74 (1979). Pilot plants
are also operating in Argentina, Japan, Spain and Taiwan. THE LAsT CHANCE, supra note 18, at
40 (1976). In addition, France, Great Britain, Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan are all developing
breeder reactors. ERDA Authoriring Legislation FY77, Post 2. Hearings Before the Subcomm on Legislation
of thelohi Comm on Atomic Energp, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1976).
100. Terrorist groups might also try to hijack U.S. nuclear weapons on foreign soil. There are,
however, reportedly sophisticated lock systems on American nuclear weapons to prevent them from
being detonated by unauthorized persons. Krieger, Terrorlsts and Nuclear Technology, 31 BULL.
ATOM. ScI. 28, 28 (June 1975).
101. Dunn, Nuclear "Gray Aarketmng," 1 Ir'L SECURITY 107, 109-10 (Winter 1977).
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quently, acquisition of nuclear material or weapons by terrorists, revolu-
tionary organizations, or criminals is a leading proliferation pathway. 102
Terrorist groups could obtain nuclear material by clandestine diversion
from civilian facilities, hijacking during transport, or purchasing
through public or private channels. If spent fuel is recycled, power
plants, fuel fabrication plants, and reprocessing plants will be potential
targets for terrorists. 10 3 Safeguards and physical security measures, if
properly implemented, should prevent theft or seizure of plutonium
from civilian facilities. Additional protection against terrorism, how-
ever, can also be achieved by such measures as denaturing1 0 4 or spiking
the fuel. 10 5 Even if a terrorist group were able to obtain plutonium or
highly enriched uranium, it still would have to make a bomb.106
When considering diversion of nuclear material, large nationalist
groups, such as the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation
Organization, should' be distinguished from smaller ideologically ori-
ented groups such as the Weathermen, the Japanese Red Army, the Ital-
ian Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhof gang, or the Uruguayan
Tuparmaros guerillas. Large nationalist groups have a better chance of
defeating safeguard measures than small ideologically-oriented groups
and are also more likely to have the necessary technical and economic
102. Comment, Policing Plutonium: The Cvil Ltbertes Fallout, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369,
401 (1975); Dunn, Nuclear Proliferation and World Politts, 430 ANNALS ACAD. POL. SOC. Sci. 96, 104-
05 (March 1977).
103. See Comment, Poicng Plutonium. The Civil Liberties Fallout, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
369, 388 (1975).
104. Denaturing involves the addition of a substance to nuclear material that destroys its suita-
bility for nuclear weapons. Uranium-238 can be used to denature uranium-235 and uranium-233,
but there is no comparable isotopic denaturant for plutonium. The addition of small amounts of
californium-252 to plutonium, however, can increase the neutron background enough to render it
useless for use in nuclear weapons. G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLITICS: INTERNA-
TIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPOSITION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 215 (1979). Coproces-
sing is another form of denaturing. In coprocessing, plutonium and unfissioned uranium are not
separated in reprocessing operations, but instead are kept together so that low concentrations of
plutonium are maintained. Hafemeister, Nonproliferation and Alternative Nuclear Technologies, 81 TECH
REV. 58, 62 (Dec/Jan. 1979).
105. Spiking involves adding one or more radioactive isotopes to plutonium or retaining some
of the fission products from spent fuel. The radioactive material emits high-energy gamma rays
and thus poses a serious hazard to hijackers. Spiking, however, would also raise fuel cycle costs and
increase health hazards to workers in the nuclear industry. Another alternative, which avoids hav-
ing to deal with intensively radioactive materials during fuel fabrication, is to attach large masses of
radioactive materials, such as cobalt-60, to the fabricated fuel or to heavily shielded containers for
the fuel. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 11 at 168.
106. Terrorists would not actually have to make a bomb in order to engage in nuclear black-
mail because plutonium is highly toxic. See generally Edsall, Toxicit of Plutonium and Some Other Acti-
nides, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sc. 26 (Sept. 1976). Consequently, terrorists could cause many deaths by
dispersing the plutonium in populated areas by means of conventional explosives. Krieger, Ter-
rorists and Nuclear Technology, 31 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 28, 31-32 (June 1975).
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resources to construct a nuclear weapon. 10 7 These nationalist groups,
however, are not likely to detonate nuclear weapons for purposes of ter-
rorism because of either the fear of losing political support for their
objectives or concern about the effect of retaliatory measures. 0 8
Smaller ideologically-oriented groups are more likely to commit physi-
cal acts of terrorism with nuclear material than the larger nationalist
groups, because the smaller groups have less to lose. It is questionable,
however, whether such groups could actually construct even a crude nu-
clear weapon. 109
2. Clandestine Diversion
Major industrialized countries are not likely to resort to clandestine
diversion because of the large amount of material that would be re-
quired for a large-scale weapons program."10 Clandestine diversion
from commercial or research reactors,'' however, may occur in a
smaller, less developed country that desires to avoid the construction of
highly visible weapons production facilities. Such clandestine activities
would allow a country to reduce the time period between the time its
intentions become known and the time it acquires an actual nuclear
capability during which it is vulnerable to a preemptive attack."l 2
Clandestine diversion of material from commercial uranium enrich-
ment facilities does not pose a direct proliferation threat, because reac-
tor grade uranium is not suitable for use in nuclear weapons."13 Reactor
grade uranium, however, can more easily be enriched to weapons grade
than natural uranium used in the civilian power program by means of a
107. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 11, at 99-100.
108. Id at 103-104.
109. Krieger, What Happens If... ? Tenrorts, Revolutionaries and Nuclear Weapons, 430 ANNALS
ACAD. OF POL. Soc. Sci. 44, 48 (March 1977). But see Meyer, Loyaka, Nelson & Williams, The
Homemade Nuclear Bomb Syndrome, 18 NUCLEAR SAFETY 427 (1977); Cohen, The Potentialities of Terror-
iwm, 32 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 34 (June 1976); Taylor, Dierstn by Non-Governmental Organizations, in
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 176, 183-87 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
110. Gilinsky, DTversion by National Governments, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY 159, 169 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
111. There are more than 300 research reactors operating around the world. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR REACTOR OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION AND
TO SUCCEED CURRENT LIGHT WATER REACTOR TECHNOLOGY 5 (EMD-79-15) (May 1979).
112. Wilson, How to Have Nuclear Power Without Weapons Producttn, 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 39, 39-
40 (Nov. 1977). Israeli warplanes attacked and destroyed a 40 megawatt Iraqi Osirak research
reactor on June 7, 1981. According to the Israelis, Iraq intended to use the reactor, which was
subject to IAEA safequards, to produce nuclear weapons for use against Israel. Heanng Before the
Subcomr. on Int'l Secunty and Scientiflc Affairs and the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Pohc and Trade of the
House Comm. on Foreign Afairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1981) (statement of Lewis A. Dunn). See
IsraeiJets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor: Attack Condemned b US and Arab Nations, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1981, at 1, col.6.
113. Note, TheJus Cogens Di'nensions of Nuclear Techntlog, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 69 (1980).
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small centrifuge plant. Diversion from reprocessing facilities poses a
more direct danger. Once a country obtains a commercial reprocessing
plant, it can recover the plutonium and use it in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. 1 4 An average size commercial plant would produce
enough plutonium for hundreds of weapons.
The U.S. position has been that commercial reprocessing plants are
difficult to safeguard effectively and, therefore, constitute a serious
proliferation risk." 5 Plutonium from commercial nuclear reactors, how-
ever, is not ideally suited for use in nuclear weapons,' 6 because it is
contaminated with other isotopes I1 7 such as plutonium-240 and pluto-
nium-241.118 Plutonium-240 sometimes fissions spontaneously without
being struck by a neutron. 1 9 If a nuclear weapon contains substantial
amounts of plutonium-240, the neutrons produced by the spontaneous
fission could cause a chain reaction to begin before a supercritical state
is reached, 120 and the resulting predetonation would cause the bomb to
release much less energy.' 2 1
There is currently no way to remove plutonium-240 from the pluto-
nium recovered by commercial reprocessing operations. 122 The level of
plutonium-240 can be kept down in military reactors by rapid fuel re-
placement, because the relative concentration of plutonium-240 in-
creases with time relative to plutonium-239 concentration. 123 Rapid
114. Gilinsky, Militay Potential of Ci'ilian Nuclear Power, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROS-
PECTS FOR CONTROL 41, 50 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
115. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING AND THE PROBLEMS OF
SAFEGUARDING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (EMD-80-38)(Mar. 18, 1980).
116. Rotblat, Controlling Weapons-Grade Fisile Material, 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 37 (June 1977).
117. Edsall, Toxict'ty of Plutonium and Some Other Actinids, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 27 (Sept. 1976).
118. Plutonium-240 is created when a plutonium-239 atom absorbs a neutron. This occurrs
about thirty percent of the time. Normally plutonium-239 fissions when struck by a neutron.
Vaughan, Nuclear At'oesio. An International Problan in Need of an International Solution, 17 ATOM. EN-
ERGY L.J. 179, 183 (1975).
119. Willrich, Worldwide Aucear Industry in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS & NUCLEAR INDUS-
TRY 45, 56 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
120. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-
GUARDS 141-42 (1977).
121. Bodarsky & Schmidt, Safety Aspects of Nuclear Energy in THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTRO-
VERSY 8, 49 (A. Murphy ed. 1976).
122. Gilinsky, Milita Potential of Civilian Nuclear Power in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROS-
PECTS FOR CONTROL 41, 48 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
123. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION supra note 11, at 10; Gilinsky, Militaq Potential of Civilian Nu-
clear Power in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 41, 44 (B. Boskey & M. Wil-
Irich eds. 1970) [hereinafter Gilinsky]. The burnup value of uranium fuel in military reactors is
limited to less than 1000 MWD/ton (mega watt days per ton). In contrast, the burnup value of
uranium fuel is about 25,000 MWD/ton in commercial reactors. Miettinin, Nuclear Aintweapons and
Low- Yield Nuclear Weapons Which Use Reactor-Grade Plutoniurm Their Ectr on the Durability of the NPT
in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
PROBLEMS 119, 123 (1974) [hereinafter Miettinin].
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fuel replacement would not be feasible in commercial light water reac-
tors, however, because they must be shut down whenever fuel is re-
placed 24 and frequent shutdowns would seriously disrupt power
production. The second contaminant is plutonium-241. 25 Like pluto-
nium-239, this isotope is fissile, but it also generates a great deal of heat
through the process of radioactive decay. A bomb containing too much
plutonium-241 could become so hot that its core would decompose, ig-
nite, or detonate the high explosives surrounding it.l26
The presence of plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 in the plutonium
recovered in reprocessing makes it difficult to fabricate an efficient nu-
clear weapon from commercial spent fuel. An inefficient nuclear device
in the one and two kiloton range, however, probably could be con-
structed, particularly if its makers were willing to take the risk of invol-
untary predetonation. 27
3. Dedicated Facilities
A nation desiring to develop a nuclear weapons program could openly
convert civilian enrichment facilities to weapons production. A gas dif-
fusion plant, for example, could be easily modified to produce weapons-
grade uranium. In fact, a single plant could service both civilian and
military enrichment needs. 28 A commercial gas centrifuge plant, with
internal rearrangements, also could be changed to produce weapons-
grade uranium. 129
Most countries, however, probably would elect to build their weapons
production facilities from scratch rather than converting existing com-
mercial facilities, particularly if secrecy is desired. The uranium route
offers one way to obtain weapons material using small-scale dedicated
facilities. A small gas centrifuge plant consisting of only 1200 cen-
trifuges could produce thirty kilograms of high-enriched uranium annu-
ally - enough for a modest size nuclear weapon. 3 0 Furthermore, if the
124. Gilinsky, supra note 123, at 48.
125. Plutonium-241 is created when plutonium-240 absorbs a neutron. GESMO, supra note
85, at I (A)-1.
126. Glackin, The Dangerous Drfl in lra'uwn Enri'hment, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 22, 25 (Feb.
1976).
127. Miettinin, supra note 123, at 123; Taylor, Nuclear &feguardr, 25 ANN. REV. NUCLEAR SCL
407, 413-14 (1975).
128. Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Indus t in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR IN-
DUSTRY 45-57 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
129. THE LAST CHANCE, supra note 18, at 44. It would, of course, be much harder to make
such a conversion secretly, particularly if the plant were safeguarded. Centrifuge plants, however,
lend themselves somewhat better to convert production to weapons grade uranium than do gas
diffusion plants. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, supra note 59, at 155.
130. Such a plant would cost no more than $20 million. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-
GUARDS, supra note 59, at 180.
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country used low-enriched uranium diverted from a commercial enrich-
ment facility as feed instead of natural uranium, only 400 centrifuges
would be needed to produce thirty kilograms of weapons-grade material
per year.13 1 The laser process of uranium enrichment would be even
better suited for use in small-scale dedicated facilities.
132
The plutonium route in dedicated facilities, however, is even more
attractive than the uranium pathway. Such an approach is inexpensive
and much less detectable than clandestine diversion from civilian power
plants, and it avoids the inconveniences of interrupting power produc-
tion.133 A small graphite moderated, air-cooled plutonium production
reactor that uses natural uranium could be constructed at a cost of $20
to $40 million and would require no highly specialized personnel to op-
erate. 134 A very small reprocessing plant could recover from fifteen to
twenty kilograms of plutonium a year from the production reactor's ir-
radiated fuel, and it could be built for under $3 million. 135 Such a
reprocessing plant would require less shielding and could use simpler
chemical processes than a commercial plant, because the level of radio-
activity in low-burn-up spent fuel is lower than in spent fuel from com-
mercial reactors. 136 Once fissile material has been obtained, any nation
with moderate technological expertise could fabricate a nuclear
weapon, 137 as most of the necessary basic information is already pub-
lished in open, technical literature. 13
Many countries have sufficient technical knowledge to construct small
131. Id at 155.
132. Krass, Laser Enrichment of Uranium: The Proliferation Connection, 196 Sci. 721, 722 (1977)
[hereinafter Laser Enrichment of Uranium ].
133. IssUES AND CHOICES, supra note 53, at 280.
134. Laser Enrichment ofUranium, supra note 132, at 729. Another study estimates the cost at $50
to $100 million. NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND
CHOICES 280 (1977).
135. Laser Enrichment of Uranium, supra note 132, at 729. India's reprocessing plant reportedly
cost about $7 million and took four years to construct. Weapons Proliferation, supra note 32, at 18.
136. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 11, at 145-46.
137. See T. Taylor, Non-Government Organirations, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NU-
CLEAR INDUSTRY 45, 183-87 (M. Willrich ed. 1972) for a discussion of the skill, components and
facilities needed to construct and assemble a small nuclear weapon.
138. Taylor, Nuclear Safeguards, 25 ANN. REV. OF NUCLEAR Sci. 407, 409 (1975). India ob-
tained its nuclear weapon in a similar manner. Note, Nuclear Proliferation.- Dim Prospectsfor Control, 3
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57, 70-71 (1976). The device was created from plutonium produced by an
unsafeguarded Cirus research reactor, which had been obtained from Canada in 1956. Scoville,
supra note 72, at 64. India used its own uranium ore to fuel the reactor, id at 65, but may have
acquired the heavy water, used as a moderator, from the United States. Walske, Nuclear Electric
Power and tae Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon States, I INT'L SECURITY 94, 100 (Winter 1977). Pluto-
nium for the nuclear device was recovered from the reactor's spent fuel at a small reprocessing plant
constructed for this purpose. Weapons Proliferation, supra note 32, at 18. The plant had a capacity of
50 metric tons per year, took four years to build and cost $7 million to develop. Id
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reactors and reprocessing plants.1 39 It would take an industrialized na-
tion approximately three years to develop such a program, while a less
developed country would require only a few years more.' 40 Small-scale
dedicated facilities such as these could be constructed and perhaps oper-
ated clandestinely, while producing enough weapons grade material for
one or two small nuclear weapons per year.14 ' Consequently, the con-
struction of dedicated facilities is a much more likely pathway to nuclear
weapons than diversion of nuclear material from commercial plants.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REGIME
A. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Since World War II, the international community has recognized
both the benefits and dangers of nuclear energy and has sought to re-
duce the risk of nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty has been the most significant international response, and it has
become the cornerstone of the international safeguards regime.14 2 The
Treaty, in general, reflects the belief that the use of safeguards over civil-
ian nuclear facilities is sufficient to prevent the misuse of these facilities.
The Treaty attempts to strike a balance between the proliferation con-
cerns of the nuclear states and the political, military, and economic aspi-
rations of the non-nuclear nations.
139. Glackin, The Dangerous Drift in Uranium Enrichment, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 22, 23 (Feb.
1976).
140. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 11, at 146.
141. Id at 145-46. A recent note on the feasibility of a "quick and dirty" reprocessing plant
concluded that a country could put such a plant into operation within six months and could pro-
duce enough plutonium for ten bombs per month. Note, The Is Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technol-
ogy, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 69 (1980).
142. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21.1
U.S.T. 438, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. The treaty was approved on
June 12,1968, by the United Nations after extended negotiations. G.A. Res. 2373, 22 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No.16A), U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1, at 5-6 (1968). The vote was 95 to 4 with 21 abstentions.
Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.- Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics,
77 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Treaty and World Politics]. For a discussion of
the negotiation and drafting of the Treaty see M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY:
FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 61-66 (1969) [hereinafter cited as M. WILLRICH];
Pendley, Scheinman, & Butler, Institutionalized Collectioe Behavior, 29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 586, 606-
608 (1975). The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1969. According to the terms of Article IX,
the Treaty became effective when ratified by the three depository governments (the United States,
Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) and 40 other signatories. Note, Nuclear Proliferation Dim Prospects for
Control, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57, 64 (1976). More than a hundred nations have ratified the
Treaty. Nye, Nonproliferatiotv A Long-Term Strategv, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 619 (1978). Fifty coun-
tries, however, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, China, France and India have not
signed. Note, Recent US Effrts to Control Nuclear Prolferation, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 276
(1977); Pugwash Council, The Second Review Conference, 36 BULL. ATOM. SC. 40, 40 (April 1980).
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Article I of the Treaty sets forth the obligations of the nuclear weap-
ons parties. 143 Under the provision, nuclear weapons parties agree not
to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices14 4 to an-
other country or any recipient, 14 5 or to surrender control over them.'
4 6
In addition, nuclear weapons parties may not assist, encourage, or in-
duce any non-nuclear weapons country to manufacture or acquire nu-
clear weapons. 147
Non-nuclear weapons parties, in turn, pledge not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or explosives.' 48 Non-nuclear weap-
ons parties also are forbidden from seeking or receiving any assistance in
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 149 Furthermore, each non-nuclear
weapons party is required to execute an agreement with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that provides for safeguards "on
all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activi-
ties" within its territory. 50 The safeguards agreement ensures that non-
nuclear weapons countries do not divert nuclear material from peace
time uses to the production of nuclear weapons.' 5 ' Under the Treaty,
exports of nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear weapons coun-
tries are prohibited, unless the exports are made subject to IAEA safe-
guards.152 Even non-signatories, therefore, ultimately may be required
to accept some safeguards to obtain nuclear material or equipment from
parties to the Treaty. 15
143. A nuclear weapons state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear device
prior to January 1, 1967. NPT, supra note 142, at art. IX, para. 3. This includes the United States,
Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China. Note, NuclearPro/iferatiotn
Dim Prospectsfor Control, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57, 64 (1976).
144. This would include nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes such as "Ploughshare" de-
vices. M. WILLRICH, supra note 142, at 69-71.
145. Transfers of nuclear weapons to other nuclear weapon states are also prohibited. Treaty
and World Politis, supra note 142, at 1463, 1474.
146. See id at 1465-74.
147. NPT, supra note 142, at art. II. Nuclear weapon states which have not signed the Treaty
are, of course, free to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries. See Treaty and World Politics, supra
note 142, at 1475-78.
148. NPT, supra note 142, at art. II. See Bunn, The Nuclear Non-Proliferatton Treaty, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 766, 771-72.
149. NPT, supra note 142, at art. II. The Treaty, however, does not ban the manufacture of
rockets or other delivery systems for nuclear weapons. See generaly id
150. NPT, supra note 142, at art. III. See Vaughan, Nuclear Di'ersion: An International Problem in
Need of an International Solution, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 179, 202 (1975).
151. Only peaceful nuclear activities are subject to safeguards. THE LAST CHANCE, supra note
18, at 90. The Treaty does not prohibit non-nuclear weapons states from using nuclear material for
nonexplosive military purposes such as nuclear propulsion of submarines and warships. Note, Nu-
clear Proliferation: Dim Prospectsfor Control, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57, 69 (1976); Treaty and World
Politics, supra note 142, at 1483; NPT, supra note 142, at art. III.
152. NPT, supra note 142, at art. III. See Bunn, supra note 148, at 774.
153. Vaughan, supra note 150, at 202; Note, Recent U.S Effrlts to Control Nuclear Proliferation, 10
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Signatories to the Treaty are given the right to develop nuclear power
for peaceful purposes and to exchange equipment, material, or scientific
data for such uses.1 54 In addition, nuclear weapons parties are directed
to make "the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology"
available to non-nuclear weapons parties. 55 The benefits include not
only reactor technology, but also any technological byproducts derived
from the development of nuclear weapons. 56 The Treaty also requires
parties to contribute to the further development of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, "especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapons
States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world."' 57
Even though the Treaty prohibits the transfer of nuclear explosives
for peaceful purposes, it obligates nuclear weapons countries to make
the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available to non-nuclear
weapon parties on a non-discriminatory basis.' 5 8 The cost for these serv-
ices must be as low as possible and should "exclude any charge for re-
search and development.' 59 Nuclear weapons parties also are required
to take further steps toward disarmament. '60 Finally, the Treaty permits
any party to withdraw from the Treaty if it determines that extraordi-
nary events have jeopardized its vital interests.' 6'
Despite its obvious importance as a barrier to proliferation, the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty has serious weaknesses. First, the Treaty
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 274-75 (1977). It is not clear, however, whether a non-nuclear
weapon country which has not signed the Treaty must submit to safeguards over all nuclear mate-
rial within its territory or only over the material supplied by a party to the Treaty. Id
154. NPT, supra note 142, at art. IV, § 1. See Overs:'ght Hearnhgs on Nuclear Enerp. Overniew ofthe
Major Issues, Oversight Hearing Before the Suaommn. on Energy and the Environment ofthe Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 752 (1975) (statement of M. Willrich).
155. W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE 163 (1976). See NPT, supra note 142, at art. IV, § 2.
156. Bunn, supra note 148, at 774.
157. NPT, supra note 142, at art. IV, § 2; see generaly Treat, and World Politics, supra note 142.
158. NPT, supra note 142, at art. V. See W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE 96 0976).
159. NPT, supra note 142, at art. V. See Bunn, supra note 148, at 772.
160. NPT, supra note 142, at art. VI.
161. NPT, supra note 142, at art. X. See W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE 96 (1976); Gilinsky,
supra note 74, at 163-68. Article X requires the withdrawing party to give three months notice to
the United Nations Security Council as well as the other parties to the Treaty. The notice must
include a statement of the extraordinary events that the withdrawing state considers to have jeop-
ardized its supreme interests. NPT, supra note 142, at art. X. The Treaty contains the following
additional provisions: Article VII authorizes the establishment of nuclear free zones. NPT, supra
note 142, at arts. VI & VII. For a discussion of the concept of nuclear free zones see Epstein, Nuclear
Free Zones, 233 SCIENTIFIC AM. 25 (Nov. 1975); Article VIII sets forth a procedure for amending the
Treaty. Any amendment must be approved by a majority of the parties to the Treaty. Any nuclear
weapons state or any state which is a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, however, may veto
the proposed amendment. Moreover, no amendment is binding on any state which fails to ratify it.
NPT,supra note 142, at art. VIII; Article IX names the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR
as depository governments for the Treaty. NPT, supra note 142, at art. IX.
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is politically unacceptable to such high risk countries as Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, Israel, South Africa and India. 162 These and many other
Third World countries regard the Treaty as a conspiracy to enable the
nuclear weapons countries to perpetuate their nuclear monopoly. 6 3
Even the more moderate developing countries are acutely aware of the
Treaty's many discriminatory features. For example, non-nuclear weap-
ons states must forego nuclear weapons entirely, while the nuclear
weapon states are merely required to negotiate eventual disarma-
ment.1 64 In addition, non-nuclear weapons countries must submit to
safeguards, but nuclear weapons countries have no such obligation. 165
Non-nuclear weapons states also are denied access to nuclear devices for
peaceful purposes, except when the devices remain under the control of
a nuclear weapons nation. 166
The Treaty, in addition, fails to provide explicit enforcement and
punishment mechanisms for violations of its terms. 16 7 It is questionable
whether the rest of the world would be willing or even able to take effec-
tive action against some violators.
Finally, the Treaty is not responsive to the national security concerns
of many Third World countries; it contains no provisions that guarantee
national security. 168 The United Nations Security Council, however,
has adopted a resolution on "security assurances" intended to protect
non-nuclear weapons parties from acts or threats of "aggression with
nuclear weapons.' 69 The United States, Great Britian, and the Soviet
Union have pledged to seek immediate Security Council action and to
provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapons party that is "a victim of
an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression . . . in which
162. Note, Recent US Effirts to Control Nuclear Proliferation, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 276
(1977).
163. Silverstein, Sharing United States Energy Technology with Less-Developed Countries: A Modelfor
International Technology Transfer, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 363, 378 (1978).
164. See Kahn & Dibble, Criteria for Long-Range Nuclear Control Policies, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 473,
478 (1967).
165. The USSR has refused to permit IAEA inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities. Treaty
and World Politics, supra note 142, at 1480-81. Recently, the United States has agreed to accept
IAEA safeguards over its civilian nuclear facilities. Note, Recent US Efforts to Control Nuclear Prolifer-
ation, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 274 (1977). It has not yet, however, signed a treaty with the
IAEA to permit safeguards inspections. Barkenbus, Whither the Treaty?, 36 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 37, 39
(April 1980).
166. This provision displeases countries like Brazil that regard peaceful nuclear explosions as
essential to some development projects. Treaty and World Politics, supra note 142, at 1465.
167. Ehrlich, The Nonproliferation Treaty and Peacefil Uses of Nuclear Explosives, 56 VA. L. REV.
587,600 (1970).
168. The United States resisted the incorporation of security guarantees into the Treaty. Com-
ment, Legal lmplicatons ofndian Nuclear Development, 4 DEN. J. INr'L L. & POL'v 237, 250 (1974).
169. 23 U.N. SCOR (1430th mtg.) (1968). See also U.N. Res. 255 (1968), U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1970).
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nuclear weapons are used."' 170
The U.N. resolution, however, does not define "aggression," and it
leaves to normal Security Council voting procedures the question of
whether aggression with nuclear weapons has occurred.' 7 1 In addition,
the security assurances are merely unilateral statements, not legally
binding obligations. 172 Moreover, they apply only to aggression by a
nuclear weapon country against a non-nuclear weapon party to the
Treaty, but the assurances do not apply when a non-nuclear weapon
country is threatened or attacked by conventional weapons.173 Conse-
quently, many of the high-risk countries have rejected the Treaty and its
related security assurances and have elected to retain their nuclear
option. ' 74
B. IAEA Safeguards
The heart of the international community's nonproliferation strategy
is the full-scope safeguards provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which requires non-nuclear weapons parties to safeguard all of
their nuclear activities.175 The Treaty, however, does not set forth any
specific safeguard requirements, but merely directs each non-nuclear
weapons state to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 176 In
practice all IAEA basic safeguards agreements are based on a single
model, 177. while the control measures to be applied to specific materials
and installations are described in subsidiary agreements. 178
170. 23 U.N. SCOR (1430th mtg.) (1968).
171. As a result, any of the five permanent council members, the United States, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, France or China, may exercise a veto. Note, Nuclear Proliferatzon: Dim Prospects for
Control, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 57, 68 (1976).
172. The assurances would have been binding only had they been expressly incorporated into
the Treaty. Id.
173. Lenefsky, The United Nations Security Couwcil Resolution on Security Assurances for Non-nuclear
Weapons States, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 56, 61 (1970).
174. See notes 162-68 supra and accompanying text.
175. Szasz, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73, 81 (M. Willrich ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Szasz]. See Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276
U.N.T.S. 4.
176. Comment, Legal Implications oIndian Nuclear Development, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 237,
238 n.12 (1974).
177. See the Structure and Content of Agreements between the agency and states required in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/153 (1971). This document is known as the Blue Book. See Rotblat, Controlling Weapons-
Grade Fissile Material, 33 BULL. ATOM. SciL 37, 41 (June 1977).
178. Szasz, supra note 175, at 81. In addition to NPT safeguards arrangements, the IAEA may
perform inspections when it arranges for the transfer of fuel or equipment, when a country unilater-
ally asks the IAEA to apply safeguards to a particular facility, and when a technical assistance
agreement between two countries designates the IAEA as the inspection agent. G. QUESTER, THE
POLITICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 211 (1973).
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IAEA safeguards rely heavily on material accountancy principles. 179
The IAEA establishes one or more material balance areas in each coun-
try. An area may include one or more nuclear facilities, or it may con-
sist of only a part of a single facility. Strict inventory controls must be
instituted for each area. Starting from an initial, verified inventory,
every change in the quantity or form of nuclear material within an area,
including transfer, production, nuclear transformation or consumption,
is recorded. Periodically, the operator's book inventory is compared
with a physical inventory independently verified by an IAEA
inspector. t80
Countries must maintain both satisfactory accounting and opera-
tional records for each materials balance area. The IAEA may examine
these records for internal consistency and consistency with other reports
and information. Accounting reports also must be submitted at regular
intervals for each materials balance area, and additional special reports
may be required if there are material losses in excess of specified
limits. 181
The IAEA conducts routine inspections to verify the consistency of an
operator's reports, to confirm the location, identity, quantity, and com-
position of all nuclear material subject to safeguards, and to obtain in-
formation on possible causes of any uncertainties in the records and any
Material Unaccounted For (MUF). On routine inspections, access is
limited to strategic points of the facility as outlined in the particular
subsidiary agreement.' 8 2
Although safeguards alone cannot completely prevent a country from
diverting nuclear materials to military uses, they can improve the
chance of discovery enough to discourage most countries from making
the attempt. 183 Early detection of diversion allows other countries suffi-
cient time in which to initiate diplomatic and other measures to en-
courage a violator to abandon its weapons program. 1' 4
179. Szasz, supra note 175, at 96.
180. For a full description of the IAEA accounting techniques see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS 206 (1977).
181. Szasz, The Adequacj of nternatinal Nuclear Safeguard, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 423, 428-30
(1975).
182. Szasz, supra note 175, at 102-08. Once inventoried by IAEA inspectors, any excess fission-
able material can be stored in sealed containers and will not be opened by the inspectors if the seals
are intact. Id at 101.
183. Palfrey, Assurance ofInternational Safeguards, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR
CONTROL 81, 83 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
184. Rose & Lester, Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons andIntonationalStabiKt)', 238 SCIENTIFIC AM.
45, 47-48 (April 1978). Safeguards were developed to reduce the likelihood of diversion of nuclear
materials and equipment from peaceful uses to military application. IAEA safeguards are designed
to detect diversion and thereby deter diversion through the risk of early detection. Vaughan, Nuclear
[Vol. 16
Controls Over Nuclear Technology
Nevertheless, the effectiveness and credibility of the IAEA safeguards
are open to serious questioning. 8 5 Indeed, the United States has taken
the position that the IAEA cannot maintain an effective safeguards pro-
gram at national uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing plants un-
less new inspection and monitoring procedures are developed. Some
commentators argue that non-nuclear weapons nations may be able to
divert small but significant quantities of nuclear material without detec-
tion under the IAEA's existing measurement and bookkeeping proce-
dures. 186  Moreover, the IAEA, because of its small budget,' 8 7
administers the safeguards program with a relatively small number of
inspectors.188 In addition, the IAEA's authority to make physical in-
spections at nuclear facilities is greatly restricted'8 9 because advanced
warning usually must be given and the operator may veto the choice of
the particular inspector.'90 Safeguarding a large reprocessing plant is
made more difficult because of the complexity of the operation and the
inaccessibility of many plant areas due to high radiation levels. 19 1
C. The Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been complemented by the
Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines. 19 2 Promulgated in 1978, the Guidelines
require suppliers to obtain formal assurances from a recipient that it will
Diversion An International Problem in Need of International Solution, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 179, 203
(1975).
185. Heanngs Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 2, 1981)
(prepared statement of Victor Gilinsky); E. MORGAN, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
IAEA SAFEGUARDS, reprinted in NUCLEAR FUEL, Nov. 23, 1981, at 9.
186. Ribicoff, A Markelt-Sharing Approach to the WorldNuclear Sales Problem, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 763,
766.
187. The IAEA budgeted $15,653,000 for safeguards checking in 1979. Szasz, Sanctions and In-
ternational Nuclear Controls, 11 CONN. L. REV. 545, 565 n.64 (1979).
188. The IAEA only has approximately 100 full-time inspectors. Weiss, Nuclear Safeguardr: A
Congressional Perspecthe 34 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 27, 29 (Mar. 1978).
189. Only declared plants are subject to inspection by IAEA personnel. They have no power
to search for clandestine operations. L. JENSEN, RETURN FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK 41 (1974);
Scoville, Technical Capabiities of Safeguards, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR COt-
TROL 53, 54 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
190. Weiss, Nuclear Safeguards: A Congressional Perspectine, 34 BULL. ATOM. Sd. 27, 29 (Mar.
1978).
191. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, supro note 56, at 209-10 (1977).
192. IAEA, Communications Received From Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines
for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technology, IAEA Doc. No. INFCIRC/254
(1978), reprntedin 17 I.L.M. 220, 225 app: (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. The United
States, the U.S.S.R., Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, West Germany, Poland, East Germany and Hungary were original signatories to the
Guidelines. Coleman, Intenational Safeguards Against Non-Government Nucear Theft. A Study of Ligal
Inadqua'e.s, 10 INT'L LAw. 493, 513 (1976). France and Japan joined the Group in 1976. Com-
ment, Pbospectsfor Nuclear Prolferation and Its Control, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 159, 182 (1976).
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not use imported nuclear material or equipment to produce a nuclear
explosive device.1 93 Recipients, in turn, are required to satisfy specified
levels of physical protection for nuclear material and equipment1 94 and
to apply IAEA safeguards to all imported material and equipment, in-
cluding imported enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water plants. 195
IAEA safeguards also must be applied to facilities constructed in the
recipient country using the technology directly transferred by the sup-
plier or derived from the transferred facilities.'9 Recipient countries
also must promise not to retransfer nuclear material derived from im-
ported facilities to another country without obtaining the same assur-
ances as those required by the supplier in the original transfer.
9 7
Moreover, the original supplier's consent must be obtained before the
recipient may retransfer any enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water
production facilities or related technology, transfer facilities or major
critical components derived from those items, or transfer any heavy
water or weapons-usable nuclear material.1 98
In general, the Guidelines exhort suppliers to exercise restraint in the
transfer of sensitive facilities and technology and weapons-usable mate-
rial' 99 and endorse the concept 6f multinational control over enrichment
and reprocessing facilities. 2° ° The Guidelines also call upon suppliers to
seek mutual agreements between supplier and recipient on arrange-
ments for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use, or retransfer of any
weapons-usable materials. 20 1 Suppliers are urged to promote interna-
tional cooperation through the exchange of information on the physical
security of facilities, protection of nuclear materials in transit, and re-
covery of stolen nuclear materials and equipment. 20 2 Suppliers also are
asked to support the effective implementation of IAEA safeguards
20 3
and to encourage the design of sensitive equipment so as to facilitate the
application of these safeguards. 2° 4 Finally, the Guidelines require sup-
pliers to consult with one another when violations occur, particularly if
a recipient detonates a nuclear device or illegally terminates or violates
193. Guidelines, supra note 192.
194. Id at Guideline 3.
195. Id at Guideline 4.
196. Id at Guideline 6.
197. Id at Guideline 10.
198. Id
199. Id at Guideline 7. See also id at Guideline 15.
200. Id at Guideline 7.
201. Id at Guideline 9.
202. Id at Guideline 11.
203. Id at Guideline 12.
204. Id at Guideline 13.
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an IAEA safeguards agreement. 20 5 The Guidelines also contemplate
that some form of concerted action would be taken against the
offender.2
0 6
The common export policy among nuclear suppliers has been a signif-
icant step toward the recognition that purely commercial considerations
should not outweigh peace and security in the field of nuclear trade. As
long as all nuclear suppliers adhere to the Suppliers' Guidelines, no re-
cipient country can evade proliferation controls by turning to other
suppliers. 20 1
The Guidelines, however, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, are re-
sented by many countries. They were formulated in secret and unilater-
ally imposed on the rest of the world.208 The Guidelines clearly are
intended to restrict the flow of sensitive nuclear technology to the less
developed countries, thereby keeping them dependent on the industrial-
ized nations for uranium fuel. Consequently, it is not surprising that
some consumer countries regard the suppliers as a secret cartel, whose
Guidelines are at variance with the technology sharing obligations of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.20 9 Thus, the Guidelines have increased
the existing tension between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and
should not be regarded as a long-term solution to the proliferation
problem.
IV. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978(NNPA) 210 is a complex
mixture of restrictions, assurances, and incentives adopted by the
United States and designed to promote nuclear safeguards and restrict
the spread of sensitive technology. The statute revised export licensing
205. Id. at Guideline 14(c).
206. The penalty might be a ban on future transfers of nuclear material or equipment. Id. at
Guideline 14.
207. Bettauer, The Nucltear Aon-iroliferation Act of1978, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1105, 1109-
10 (1978).
208. Meetings of the Suppliers Group were held in secret and even the original membership
was not initially revealed. G. ROCluN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLrrics 163 (1979).
209. Nye, Proferation. A Long- Term Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 614 (1978).
210. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-82,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2160a (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as NNPA].
For a legislative history of the act see The Nuclear Antiproiferation Act of /977- Hearings and Markup on
HR. 8638 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientif Affairs and the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy
and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'7 Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); Nuclear Non-PAoliferation
Policy Act of 1977: Hearings on S 897 and S 1432 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development
of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1978); Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1977: Hearings on S 897 Before the Subcomtn. on Energy, Nuclear Proiferation, and Federal Services of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Nuear Non-Proiferation and
Export Controls. Hearing on S 897 and S 1432 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, and Intl
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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procedures, established criteria for export licenses, imposed strict condi-
tions on new agreements for nuclear cooperation, provided for nuclear
fuel assurances and endorsed multinational approaches to reduce the
risk of nuclear proliferation and to develop energy alternatives.
21
'
A. Export Licensing Procedures and Criteria
The NNPA has substantially changed U.S. nuclear export licensing
procedures212 and has established criteria to govern the export of nu-
clear material, equipment, and sensitive nuclear technology. 213
Recipents must apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material, equip-
ment, and sensitive technology imported from the United States and to
all nuclear material used in, or produced through the use of American
material or equipment.214 Furthermore, the NNPA qequires that IAEA
safeguards be applied to all of the recipient state's peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities. 215 The purpose of this full-scope safeguards requirement is to
remove the advantage nonsigners of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have
over parties to the Treaty.216 The recipient also must guarantee that
adequate physical security measures will be provided for the U.S.-origin
and derived equipment and material.217 In addition, the United States
must approve retransfer of U.S.-origin nuclear material, equipment, or
sensitive nuclear technology and of any nuclear material produced
211. Seg enerally, Bettauer, supra note 207.
212. Formerly, the NRC could issue an export license if it concluded that the proposed export
would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2077(c)(2), 2099, 2111 (Supp. 1979). The new act,
however, has established a two-tiered licensing process. First, the executive branch must determine
whether the Act's export criteria have been met and whether the applicant has complied with the
provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(1)(Supp. 1979). Once
the executive branch's report has been issued, the NRC must make an independent determination
that the recipient has met the export criteria, 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (a)(2)(Supp. 1979), and that the
proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety
of the American public, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (Supp. 11 1978). If the NRC denies an export license,
notwithstanding a favorable executive branch judgment, the President may overrule its decision if
he concludes that denial of the export license would be contrary to American non-proliferation
policy or would adversely affect other national security interests. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(2)(Supp.
1979). If the President uses an executive order to authorize an export, notwithstanding the denial
of an expert license by the NRC, the Congress can override the President's decision by passing a
concurrent resolution of disapproval. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2156(b)(Supp. 1979).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2156 (Supp. 1979).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2157(a)(l)(Supp. 1979).
216. Nye, Non-Aolferalior" A Long-Tem Slrazegy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 612 (1978).
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156(3), 2156Q (Supp. 1979). The NRC has issued regulations establishing
levels of protection that will be considered sufficient to meet this export criterion. 10 C.F.R.
§ 110.43 (1981). For the most part, the level of protection required is similar to that described in
IAEA publication INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
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through the use of such exports. 218 The NNPA requires further that no
spent fuel produced from enriched uranium supplied by the United
States may be reprocessed without American consent. 219
Although some commentators believe that the Act has unnecessarily
complicated the nuclear export licensing process, 220 there have been, in
general, no serious problems with acceptance of the NNPA's provi-
sions, 22' except in the case of India. The NRC has been compelled on
several occasions to deny export licenses to India, because it refused to
accept full-scope safeguards. In each instance, the President has over-
ruled the Commission and successfully withstood congressional disap-
proval. 222 In the fall of 1980, however, a presidential overruling of the
NRC almost was reversed by Congress when India sought export
licenses to buy thirty-eight tons of enriched uranium for the Tarapur
Atomic Power Station.223
B. Agreements for Cooperation
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, bilateral agreements for coop-
eration are used as the framework within which to implement interna-
tional nuclear cooperation and commercial nuclear exports.224 Nuclear
equipment and material must be licensed for export in accordance with
an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the recipi-
ent nation. The agreement sets forth controls and safeguards and au-
thorizes private transactions.225 The NNPA changed the procedures for
entering into agreements for cooperation, 226 provided for additional re-
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2156(4)(Supp. 1979).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2156(5)(Supp. 1979). Most agreements for cooperation already provided that
spent fuel produced from American enriched uranium could not be reprocessed unless the United
States and the recipient country jointly determined that the safeguards provision of the agreement
could be effectively applied. This, in effect, has given the U.S. a veto over reprocessing decisions.
Bettauer, supra note 207, at 1151.
220. Neff & Jacoby, Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market, 57 FOREIGN AFF.
1123, 1128 (1979).
221. Doub, International Nuc/ear Daeloprnent in the Age ofInterdependence, 32 VAND. L. REV. 843,
873 (1979).
222. See Edlow Int'l Co., 7 NRC 436 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12,055, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,157
(1978).
223. See 126CONG. REc. H9099-9100 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980); 126 CONG. REC. S13288 (daily
ed. Sept. 24, 1980).
224. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 123, 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1979). See INTERNATIONAL INSTRU-
MENTS FOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 495-639 (M. Muntzing ed. 1978).
225. Bettauer, supra note 207, at 1111.
226. Agreements are now negotiated by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Energy and in consultation with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA). A completed agreement is submitted jointly to the President by the Secretaries of
State and Energy, accompanied by their own views and recommendations and those of the NRC
and ACDA. In addition, the ACDA must provide the President with an unclassified Nuclear
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quirements for new agreements, and directed the President to renegoti-
ate existing agreements for cooperation in order to bring them into
compliance with the additional requirements. 227
The NNPA requires agreements for the cooperation to specify that
safeguards will continue as long as the affected material or equipment
remains under the control of the cooperating party, even if the agree-
ment itself is terminated or suspended, and that recipients agree to sub-
ject all of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. 228 New
and amended agreements also must contain provisions for physical se-
curity, 229 and they must guarantee that no transferred nuclear material,
sensitive equipment or technology, or nuclear material derived there-
from will be used for any nuclear explosive device or related military
purpose.2 30
In addition, agreements for cooperation must allow the United States
to demand the return of nuclear material and equipment if a non-nu-
clear weapons recipient detonates a nuclear explosive device or abro-
gates an IAEA safeguards agreement. 23' New and amended agreements
must also ensure that no U.S.-origin nuclear material, equipment, or
sensitive technology will be transferred by the recipient to a third coun-
try without American consent. 232 The consent right extends to the re-
transfer of any fuel irradiated in an American reactor, even though the
fuel itself may have been obtained from a non-American source.233 New
agreements also must state that no material transferred or produced
through American nuclear exports will be reprocessed or enriched with-
out the prior approval of the United States.234 In effect, such a right of
prior consent grants a veto power over the reprocessing of any fuel, re-
gardless of origin, if it is irradiated in U.S.-origin reactors.
Proliferation Assessment Statement on the adequacy of the safeguards and assurances in the pro-
posed agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(Supp. 1979). The President may approve the proposed
agreement after making a written determination that it will promote the common defense and
security. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(b) (Supp. 1979). The proposed agreement is then submitted to Congress
and becomes effective in 60 days unless Congress vetoes it. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (Supp. 1979).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2153c(a) (Supp. 1979).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(6) (Supp. 1979).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(6) (Supp. 1979).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). Sensitive nuclear technology includes any informa-
tion (including information incorporated in equipment) which is not available to the public and
which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a facility
used for uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing or heavy water production. 22 U.S.C. § 3203(a)(6)
(Supp. 1979).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(9) (Supp. 1979).
233. Ste 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(7) (Supp. 1979).
234. The agreement may, however, define the conditions necessary for U.S. approval. In addi-
tion, the NNPA's provisions on subsequent agreements specify how these consent rights will be
exercised. 42 U.S.C. § 2160 (Supp. 1979).
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Finally, the Act requires that new agreements for cooperation contain
an enrichment consent right applicable to American uranium ore ex-
ported for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling.235 The NNPA
also requires the United States to reserve approval rights over facilities
for storage of weapons-useable material, which is transferred for enrich-
ment purposes, or material produced through the use of U.S.-origin ma-
terial or equipment. 236
According to some commentators, American efforts to revise unilater-
ally the terms of existing agreements for cooperation violate principles of
international law. 23 1 In addition, the consent right requirement has
caused considerable friction with Western Europe. The Act exempted
the IAEA and Euratom from the rule, which was made effective imme-
diately, if they agreed to begin renegotiation of their agreements for co-
operation within thirty days of its enactment date.23 8 The IAEA
complied with this condition but Euratom refused,23 9 forcing the United
States to ban further nuclear exports to Euratom nations. 24° The im-
passe, however, was broken six months later when Euratom agreed to
"discussions" on some of the issues.24 1
C. Subsequent Arrangements
A subsequent arrangement is a contract or agreement between a fed-
eral agency and a foreign government concerning supply contracts, re-
transfer approval, physical security measures, spent fuel management,
safeguards, and any other matter important to preventing prolifera-
tion.242 Special approval in the form of a subsequent arrangement is
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2153a(a) (Supp. 1979).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(8) (Supp. 1979).
237. Szegilongi, Unilateral Reviurni of Interaatonal Nuclear Supply Arrangements, 12 INT'L LAW 857,
859 (1978).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(2) (Supp. 1979).
239. Euratom is an organization composed of the European Common Market countries. Its
purpose is to promote the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power among its members. G.
ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLmcs 30-34 (1974); THE LAST CHANCE, sUpra note 18, at
15.
240. Gleason, Nuclear Power at Home and Abroad The Qst for a ew Proliferation Poliy, 11 CONN.
L. REv. 512, 527-29 (1979).
24I. Bettauer, supra note 207, at 1153.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2160(a)(2) (Supp. 1979). The Secretary of Energy must obtain the concur-
rence of the Secretary of State and consult with the Director of the Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Secretary of Defense before
approving subsequent arrangements. 42 U.S.C. § 2160(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). The Secretary of En-
ergy must determine that the proposed subsequent arrangement will not be inimical to the com-
mon defense and security. 42 U.S.C. § 2160(a)(l)(Supp. 1979). If, however, the subsequent
arrangement involves reprocessing, retransfer of spent fuel to a third country for reprocessing, or
subsequent retransfer of any significant amount of plutonium produced as a result of reprocessing,
before the arrangement goes into effect the Secretary must provide the House Committee on Inter-
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required to reprocess spent fuel in any facility that has not previously
reprocessed power fuel assemblies. 243 In addition, the Secretaries of En-
ergy and State must conclude that the reprocessing or retransfer will
take place under conditions that will provide a timely warning of any
diversion before a recipient's diverted material can be used in a nuclear
explosive device. 244
D. Termination of American Nuclear Cooperation
The NNPA requires the United States to terminate nuclear coopera-
tion with any non-nuclear weapons state that violates or repudiates a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 245 Cooperation also must be ter-
minated with any non-nuclear weapons state that detonates a nuclear
explosive device or engages in activities directly related to their manu-
facture or acquisition. 24 6 Furthermore, the Act requires termination of
cooperation with any nation that violates an agreement for cooperation,
encourages any non-nuclear weapons state to engage in the manufacture
or acquisition of nuclear explosives, or transfers reprocessing equipment,
materials, or technology to a non-nuclear weapons state, except in con-
nection with an international agreement to which the United States
subscribes. 247
E. Multilateral Iniiatives
The NNPA requires the President to seek an international agreement
national Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with a report of his reasons for
entering into the arrangement. Id
243. For a more detailed discussion see Note, Nuclear Rrohferalzon and Subsequent Arrangements For
Retransfer For Reprocessing, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 121-41 (1979). Special approval is also necessary
for a subsequent arrangement to return more than 500 grams of plutonium from reprocessed spent
fuel to its country of origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2160(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
244. Because the British plant at Windscale was operating at the time of the Act's passage it
was exempted from the timely warning requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 2160(b)(3) (Supp. 1979). The
Japanese, however, intended to reprocess their spent fuel at the THORP (Thermal Oxide
Reprocessing Plant) facility, to be built near the existing plant at Windscale. Some members of
Congress were concerned that U.S. approval of the Japanese request might be interpreted as ex-
tending the Windscale exemption to the THORP plant as well. The Administration declared that
it had applied the timely warning requirement when it approved the Japanese request. Gleason,
supra note 6, at 529-30. A request by a Japanese utility company to transfer spent fuel to France for
reprocessing was also approved. Id at 531.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 2158(1) (Supp. 1979). The President, however, may waive this provision if he
determines that cessation of exports would interfere with American nonproliferation objectives. 42
U.S.C. § 2158(2) (Supp. 1979). Such waiver must be submitted to Congress during a period of 60
days of continuous session before it enters into force. Congress may, by concurrent resolution, over-
ride the President's action. Id
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2158(l)(A)(D) (Supp. 1979).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 2158 (2)(B) (Supp. 1979).
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on physical security measures applicable to nuclear activities 248 and to
negotiate international procedures that deal with diversion, theft, or
sabotage of nuclear material or facilities and that provide for the recov-
ery of lost or stolen nuclear material. 249 Furthermore, the Act calls upon
the United States to confer with other countries on the response to take
if any nation violates its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear ma-
terial, equipment or technology. 250 The President also must attempt to
gain other nations' assents to export controls similar to the requirements
of the NNPA. 251
The NNPA, in general, advocates the multinationalization of the nu-
clear fuel cycle,252 and calls for sensitive aspects of the process to be
placed under "effective international auspices and inspection. 253 Such
an arrangement would include comprehensive IAEA safeguards, inter-
national or multinational participation in the operation or ownership of
sensitive facilities, international or multinational ownership of reactor
fuel, sanctions for unauthorized use of these facilities or material pro-
duced therefrom, and an enforceable ban on national sensitive facilities
in nations that obtain fuel assurances from these international facili-
ties.254 In recognizing the need to furnish a reliable supply of nuclear
fuel to countries that support non-proliferation 255 and in affirming
America's commitment to develop additional uranium enrichment ca-
pacity, the NNPA directs the President to join with other countries in
multilateral initiatives to cope with future nuclear fuel demands. 256
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2153b (a)(3)(c) (Supp. 1979).
249. 22 U.S.C. § 3243 (3) (Supp. 1979). The United States currently is conducting negotia-
tions on physical security measures with other countries. Under the American proposal, a conven-
tion would be drafted to require adequate physical security during international shipment of
nuclear materials as a condition of export or import. Measures also would be developed for mutual
assistance in the recovery of lost or stolen nuclear material. In addition, theft of nuclear material
would be treated as an international offense with provision for the extradition and trial of serious
offenders. Bettauer, supra note 207, at 1164-65.
250. 22 U.S.C. § 3243(1) (Supp. 1979).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2153b (Supp. 1979). An important objective of this provision would be to get
every supplier to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear export.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2153b(l) (Supp. 1979).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2153b(b)(2) (Supp. 1979). The Act endorses efforts like the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). 22 U.S.C. § 3224 (Supp. 1979). INFCE was aimed at
developing alternative fuel cycles and assuring access to nuclear fuel for nations sharing common
non-proliferation objectives. Fifty-three countries and four international organizations participated
in the two-year study. It evaluated uranium enrichment availability, nuclear fuel supply assur-
ances, reprocessing, plutonium handling and recycling, fast breeders, spent fuel storage, nuclear
waste management and disposal, and advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts. Bettauer, supra
note 207, at 1169-70.
254. S. REP. No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted i [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 326, 349-50.
255. 22 U.S.C. § 3221 (Supp. 1979).
256. 22 U.S.C. § 3222 (Supp. 1979).
1981]
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
Specifically, the Act calls for the establishment of the International Fuel
Authority (INFA) to provide enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing,
and spent fuel storage services.2 57 The major function of INFA would
be to provide nuclear fuel if a supplier refused to honor a supply
contract .258
V. A CRITIQUE OF U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
A. The Limits of Unilateral Action
Many countries maintain that America's non-proliferation policy is
contrary to their vital interests.2 59 Consequently, they are likely either to
oppose this policy or to give it only lukewarm support. The industrial-
ized nations argue that America's attitude toward fuel recycling ignores
their energy situation.2 60 For example, in 1975, Europe imported about
sixty percent of its requirements. 26 1 In addition, Japan currently im-
ports nearly eighty-five percent of its needs, mostly in imported oil from
expensive and unreliable Middle Eastern sources.2 62 The United States
also aggravates Europe's and Japan's energy problems by competing
with them for OPEC oil.263 Unlike the United States, most industrial-
ized countries are without significant alternative energy sources264 and
have no choice but to rely on nuclear power if they are to overcome
their dependence on foreign oil.265 Since world uranium supplies are
257. 22 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(1)(Supp. 1979). Seealso Marshall, Secton 104 of the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Act of 1978- Establishment of lnternational Nuclear Supply Assurances, II N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
399 (1979).
258. 22 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(2)-(6) (Supp. 1979). Pending the establishment of INFA, the Presi-
dent may submit proposals to Congress for initial fuel assurances, including the creation of an
interim stockpile of enriched uranium for this purpose. 22 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(3)-(6) (Supp. 1979).
259. See Hildenbrand, A German Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Pohiv, 3 INT'L SECURITY 51
(Fall 1978); Chari, An Indian Reaction to US Nonproliferation Polic, 3 INT'L SECURITY 57 (Fall 1978);
Imai, AJapanse Reaction to US A'onprolferation Poliy, 3 INT'L SECURITY 62 (Fall 1978).
260. Neff & Jacoby, Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market, 57 FOREIGN AFF.
1123, 1131 (1979).
261. HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L REL., 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., NUCLEAR ORDER AND HUMAN
VALUES: REPORT ON THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OF THE EURO-
PEAN PARLIAMENT 53 (Comm. Print 1977). See also WORKSHOP ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
STRATEGIES, ENERGY SUPPLY TO THE YEAR 2000 (1977).
262. R. DORF, ENERGY, RESOURCES AND POLICY 62 (1978).
263. Lovins, World Energy Strategies, 30 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 14, 20 (May 1974).
264. Europe has an estimated 320 billion tons of coal, primarily in Germany and France.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST SESs., GEOPOLI-
TICS OF ENERGY 68 (Comm. Print 1977). France and Italy have very little coal. Japan has only
modest coal reserves. Oil shale has been found in Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, France, Spain,
Italy and Greece, but none of these deposits have commercial potential at the present time. 13
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, OIL SHALES 535, 538 (1976).
265. Se Rodansky & Schmidt, 7he Nuclear Alternatie, 30 MERCER L. REV. 395, 401 (1979).
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limited, many industrialized countries regard fuel recycling as essential
to their energy security and look forward to early commercialization of
breeder reactors. 266
American opposition to fuel recycling continues to be a matter of
great concern to Europe and Japan. 267 Under the NNPA, American
permission is required before nuclear fuel from American-supplied en-
riched uranium can be reprocessed in European or Japanese facilities. 268
Thus, if the United States prohibits the transfer of spent fuel to Euro-
pean reprocessing plants, both the owners of the reprocessing plants and
the owners of the spent fuel will be in serious trouble.
American efforts to control sensitive nuclear technology also have
caused resentment in the Third World.269 Energy use in developing
countries, while still relatively low per capita, is increasing rapidly, 270
particularly because production of energy-intensive goods is usually nec-
essary to sustain a program of rapid industrialization. 27' Aside from the
OPEC countries, however, most of the underdeveloped areas of the
world are energy deficient. 272 Thus, most of the Third World relies
heavily on imported energy, and as a result, the rising cost of oil has
266. Hafele & Sassin, Energy Options and Strategiesfor Western Europe, 200 Scl. 164 (1978). Over
the next decade, the Windscale plant in England is scheduled to receive about 4000 metric tons of
spent fuel from other countries, and France's reprocessing plant at La Hague will reprocess about
6000 metric tons of spent fuel. When transport costs are included, these contracts are worth about
$3 billion to Great Britain and France. Gilinsky, Plutonium, Prohferation and the Pnce ofReprocessing,
57 FOREIGN AFF. 374, 376 (1978).
267. Note, Nuclear Proliferation and Subsequent Arrangements for Retransfer for Reprocessing, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 99, 118-20 (1979).
268. According to the NNPA, the United States must approve the following activities: (1)
transfer of spent fuel out of the country where it was irradiated, (2) reprocessing of the spent fuel,
and (3) return of the plutonium to the owner of the spent fuel. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156(4)-(5) (Supp.
1979); 42 U.S.C. § 2160(b)(2) (Supp. 1979). The Act also requires that new or amended agree-
ments for cooperation give the United States a prior approval right over reprocessing of fuel not
supplied by the United States if it has been irradiated in a U.S.-supplied reactor. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2156(4) (Supp. 1979).
269. Subrahmanyam, The Nuclear Issue and International Securit, 33 BULL. AToM. SCI. 17, 19-20
(Feb. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Security].
270. Developing countries use about 25 million BTUs of energy per capita each year, as com-
pared with 350 million BTUs per capita in the United States. R. DORF, ENERGY, RF.SOURCES AND
POLICY 5-7 (1978). On an aggregate basis, the industrialized nations, with 17% of the world's
population, use 60% of its energy, while the developing countries, with more than half the world's
people, use only 10%. Hauser, WorldEnergy Demandand NationalEnergy Pol'y, 102 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
22, 23 (Sept. 28, 1978).
271. Martin & Pinto, Energyfor the Third World, 80 TECH. REV. 48, 51 (June-July 1978).
272. In Latin America, for example, only Mexico and Venezuela have significant oil resources;
Libya, Algeria and Nigeria are large oil producers, but the rest of the African continent lacks ade-
quate fossil fuel resources. In Asia, only Iran, Indonesia and China are energy independent. See
general McKelvey, World Energy Reserves and Resources, 96 PuB. UTIL FORT. 27 (Sept. 25, 1975);
McKelvey, World Energy. The Resource Prcture, 10 CASE W. RFs. J. INT'L. L. 597 (1978).
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caused severe economic hardship.273 It is not surprising, therefore, that
many of these countries see nuclear power as a most promising way to
reduce their dependence on foreign oil. Some developing countries even
desire to become nuclear exporters.274
The trend toward increasing use of nuclear power in the Third World
has been reinforced by two recent technological developments, both of
which make nuclear power more suitable for the small electric grids of
less developed countries. The first is a prefabricated 200 megawatt reac-
tor that can be mass-produced to provide electric power at competitive
costs. The second is new load shedding technology that substantially
reduces the risk of concentrating a large proportion of a system's capac-
ity in a single generating unit.275
Developing countries with substantial nuclear power programs, like
the industrialized nations, are concerned about the future availability of
uranium fuel and, therefore, are also interested in fuel recycling. Most
of these countries cannot afford a commercial scale reprocessing plant
and must send their spent fuel to Europe or Japan for reprocessing.
Current U.S. non-proliferation policy directly threatens the developing
nations' plans to reprocess spent fuel in industrialized nations and to
acquire eventually their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Many developing countries regard these restrictions as discriminatory
and designed to perpetuate existing inequalities and dependencies be-
tween the industrialized and the developing countries of the world.276
In addition, mastery of complex technology plays an important role
in the Third World's search for status and respect within the interna-
tional community. Less developed countries, therefore, value the acqui-
sition of nuclear technology for reasons of prestige, as well as
economics.2 77 Third World countries no longer want to purchase nu-
clear facilities on a turn-key basis but are insisting on advanced techni-
cal training as an essential component of a nuclear project. 278
273. Silverstein, Sharing United States Energy Technology with Less Developed Countries.- A Modelfor
International Technology Transfer, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 363, 364 (1978).
274. Argentina, for example, is exporting nuclear technology to Peru and hopes to become a
supplier to other developing countries. India is also considering the production of nuclear reactors
for export. Bailey, When and Why Weapons, 36 BULL. ATOM. SCi. 42, 42-43 (April 1980).
275. Egan & Arungu-Olende, Nuclear Powerfor the Third World, 82 TECH. REV. 46, 47-50 (May
1980). Together, these developments could expand the potential market for nuclear reactors in
developing countries by an additional 100 units or more over the next two decades. Id
276. Bloomfield, Nuclear Spread and World Order, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 743, 745-46 (1975).
277. Scheinman, Security and a Tranenational System, The Cae of Nuclear Energy, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD PoLTrrIcs 276, 280 (R. Keohane & J. Nye eds. 1972).
278. By upgrading their scientific capabilities, developing countries believe that they can in-
crease the progress of industrialization and thereby enhance their national images. Bailey, When and
Why Weapons, 36 BULL. ATOM. ScI. 42, 42 (April 1980). Thus, for example, the recent German-
Brazilian reactor sales agreement provided for the formation of several mixed companies to ensure
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Without the support of other countries, America's technology restric-
tions cannot succeed. In the past, U.S. domination of the reactor export
market and its control over uranium enrichment services have allowed it
to act unilaterally.2 79 America's reactor sales abroad, however, have
been drastically reduced by European competition. 280 More impor-
tantly, the United States has lost its monoploy over the supply of nu-
clear fuel.28 1
Other events also have inhibited American freedom of action in the
Third World. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example, forced
the United States to lift trade sanctions imposed against Pakistan, even
though it refused to abandon its reprocessing program. The withdrawal
of sanctions was seen by the developing countries as evidence that the
United States could not enforce its non-proliferation policies in the
Third World. 2 2 The shipment of uranium fuel to India without full-
scope safeguards, notwithstanding the mandate of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act, also reflected the inability of the United States to im-
pose its wishes upon Third World countries.
B. Commercial Nuclear Facilities and the Proliferation Problem
The present U.S. non-proliferation policy places too much emphasis
on the possible misuses of nuclear technology. Many technological de-
velopments have military applicability, even though their primary pur-
pose is non-military. The railroad, the radio, computers, and the steam
engine each affected military tactics, in addition to impacting upon the
Brazilian participation in all phases of nuclear development. Gall, Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,
32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 4, 5-6 (June 1976). India also has pursued an ambitious nuclear research and
development program. Se Marwah, India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Poli, 2 INT'L
SECURITY 96 (Fall 1977).
279. Bauser, United States Nuder Export Policy. Dkw/oping the Peacefil Atom as a Commodiy in Inter-
national Trade, 18 HARV. INr'L L. J. 227, 238 (1977).
280. Joskow, The International Nuclear Industry Today, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 788, 792-95 (1976).
American companies supplied only 2 of the 29 nuclear reactors ordered by foreign countries in
1978. Gleason, Nuclear Power at Home and Abroad The Questfor a New Nonprolferation Poi, 11 CONN.
L. REV. 512, 512-13 (1979).
28 1. The Soviet Union now provides 4.8 million SWUs of enrichment services to Europe each
year. Neff & Jacoby, Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market, 7 FOREIGN AFF. 1123,
1134 n.12 (1979). EURODIF, an international consortium company composed of France, Belgium,
Spain, Italy, and Iran, is building a gas diffusion plant that is expected to reach a capacity of 10.7
million SWUs by 1982. Joskow, The lntenational Nuclear Industy Today, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 788, 795-
96 (1976). URENCO, an Anglo-German-Dutch organization, also is building a 2 million-SWU gas
centrifuge facility scheduled to be completed in 1984. Drenco Captures Contraar Once Hed by DOE 22
NUCLEAR NEWS 96 (June 1979). In addition, Japan has constructed a small gas centrifuge plant
and has plans to begin commerical scale enrichment operations by 1985. 22 NUCLEAR NEWS 123
(Feb. 1980); Kratzer, Nuclear Cooperation and Non-Prolferation, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 250, 273
(1976).
282. Egan & Arungu-Olende, supra note 275, at 52.
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civilian economy. Suppressing civilian applications of a particular tech-
nology to prevent its military use is like throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. Such a policy not only foregoes the benefits of peaceful ap-
plications of the technology, but its efforts to restrict military applica-
tions must eventually fail.
The current controversy over nuclear power is somewhat reminiscent
of the concerns of the 1920's and 1930's over the connection between
commercial aviation and bombers.2 83 Suppression of commercial avia-
tion no doubt would have slowed the development of military aircraft
but would not have completely halted it. At the same time, society
would have been deprived of the benefits of commercial aviation.
Of course, because the technology for peaceful and military uses of
nuclear energy is the same,284 any large-scale establishment of commer-
cial enrichment and reprocessing facilities invites diversion or hijacking
by terrorist groups. 28 5 In addition, clandestine diversion of nuclear ma-
terial by a country from its commercial enrichment or reprocessing
plants is always possible. These risks, however, can be drastically re-
duced by establishing appropriate technological and institutional barri-
ers. 286 For example, terrorism can be thwarted by safeguards and
rigorous physical security measures. Denaturing and spiking are two
additional methods that can be used to provide additional protection
against terrorists. 287
Safeguards also discourage national efforts to remove secretly nuclear
material from commercial enrichment and reprocessing plants. To date,
even the most recalcitrant high-risk country has been willing to accept
safeguards over sensitive facilities imported from other countries.288 Al-
though safeguards are not foolproof, the risk of detection and resulting
international embarrassment is sufficient so that a country, determined
to develop nuclear weapons, will choose the less risky route of construct-
ing dedicated facilities. In other words, the slim possibility that one
country might misuse its commercial nuclear facilities is an insufficient
reason to deprive other countries of the benefits of nuclear technology.
283. Quester, Nuckar Proliferaion" Linkages and olutiomn, 33 INT'L ORGANIZATION 541, 557
(1979).
284. Treaty and World Politcs, supra note 142, at 1455.
285. Up to 2 million kilograms of plutonium will be produced in the next 15 years worldwide
in civilian nuclear power programs. Weiss, supra note 99, at 30. If recycling were to occur, as much
as 92,000 kilograms per year might be in circulation. See M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR
THEFr: RisKs & SAFEGUARDS 65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR THEFT].
286. For a discussion of various institutional barriers, see NUCLEAR THEFT, supra note 285, at
135-48.
287. See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text.
288. See notes 20-42 supra and accompanying text.
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The present international safeguards regime, however, is based on this
premise.
The United States also maintains that sensitive commercial facilities
will facilitate nuclear weapons development in other indirect ways, in-
cluding by the replication of imported facilities.289 Given the determi-
nation of Third World countries to acquire sensitive facilities and to
master the technology involved, there is reason to believe that some
countries may attempt to construct copies of imported plants.290 If rep-
licated facilities are not subject to safeguards, they will be vulnerable to
clandestine, or even open, diversion of nuclear material. This is one of
the reasons the United States seeks to impose full-scope safeguards on all
its nuclear customers. 29'
It must be kept in mind, however, that non-nuclear weapons states
that are parties to the NPT cannot legally avoid safeguards in such a
manner, ,because they have agreed to full-scope safeguards. 29 2 While na-
tions not party to the Treaty also may construct unsafeguarded facili-
ties, suppliers can protect against this by requiring, as West Germany
did in the Brazilian reactor sales agreement,293 that safeguards also be
applied "to replicated facilities. 294 Failure to honor such an agreement
would bea violation of international law and would subject the violator
to potential sanctions from other nuclear suppliers, as provided in the
Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines.295 Such concerns apply only to commer-
cial facilities, which are too large to be secretly constructed and
maintained.
Some; countries, however, may utilize knowledge obtained from con-
structing or operating commercial plants to build smaller-scale versions
as secret dedicated facilities. This would not happen in the case of gas
diffusion 296 or Becker enrichment plants29 7 because they could not be
substantially scaled-down. Gas centrifuge plants, as yet, have not be-
come a serious problem because the technology is not yet fully devel-
289. See SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES, & FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION Acr OF 1978, S. REP. No. 467, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 326, 347 [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
290. See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
291. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 289, at 23.
292. See NPT, supra note 142, at art. III.
293. Lowrance, supra note 38, at 205-06.
294. Comment, Prospctsfor Nuclear Proferation and Its Control, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 159,
187 (1976).
295. See Guidelines, supra note 192, at Guideline 14.
296. The size, amount of electricity, and cost of a gas diffusion plant make it impractical to
operate secretly. See Glackin, supra note 65, at 23; notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
297. The large quantities of electricity required by the Becker process make it unfeasible to
operate secretly even a scaled down facility. See Glackin, supra note 65, at 22.
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oped. 298 In addition, even small-scale gas centrifuge plants may be
difficult to construct and operate secretly. 299
Clandestine reprocessing plants are another matter. Technical infor-
mation on fuel reprocessing is largely available in open literature,3s 0 and
at least eighteen countries have access to it, although technical informa-
tion in the form of engineering know-how is not so widespread.30' Be-
cause military reprocessing plants are much simpler to construct and
operate than commercial facilities,302 a near-nuclear country probably
could construct one, as India did, without experience gained from oper-
ating commercial facilities.303 Indeed, suppression of commercial
reprocessing facilities offers at best only a small barrier to nuclear weap-
ons development if dedicated facilities are utilized.
Given the critical energy needs of Western Europe, Japan, and many
developing countries, the United States will not be able unilaterally to
prevent diffusion of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Instead, the
United States should seek other means of achieving its non-proliferation
goals and, in general, should pursue a policy based on cooperation
rather than coercion. Although every effort should be made to safe-
guard effectively sensitive commercial facilities, commercial enrichment
and reprocessing plants alone are not a serious enough proliferation risk
to justify compelling other countries to forego the use of these facilities
in their nuclear power programs. A number of developing countries will
have sufficient economic and technological resources to produce nuclear
weapons through the use of dedicated facilities in the next decade or
two. Restricting access to commercial enrichment and reprocessing fa-
cilities may delay this result but it cannot prevent it. The United States,
therefore, must support measures that respond to the energy problems of
both industrialized and developing countries while minimizing the
proliferation potential of sensitive facilities. Where possible, such initia-
tives should occur on a multilateral basis. A policy of cooperation as-
sumes the legitimacy of other nation's energy concerns and recognizes
that fuel recycling may be necessary for some to attain energy security.
298. Id
299. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
300. THE LAST CHANCE, supra note 18, at 169; Weiss, supra note 99, at 30. Over 11,000 techni-
cal papers on plutonium technology were declassified as a result of the Atoms for Peace Program.
Ilke, Bombs and Reactors: The Nuclear Divide, 36 BULL. ATOM. Scl. 38, 41 (Jan. 1980).
301. Scheinman, Safeguarding Reprxessing Faciities: 7he Impact of Multnatonalizahon, in INTER-
NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 65, 67 (A. Chayes & W.B. Lewis
eds. 1977).
302. NUCLEAR PROUFERATION, supra note 11, at 145-46.
303. Prospecti for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 16, at 166. See generally notes 134-38 supra and
accompanying text.
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VI. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
A. Energy Alternatives
As asserted, sensitive commercial nuclear facilities, when properly
safeguarded, do not pose an unacceptable proliferation risk. This does
not mean that the United States should encourage other countries to
pursue fuel recycling programs, but it does militate against the unilat-
eral application of measures to discourage fuel recycling. At the same
time, however, the United States should promote alternative energy
strategies that involve a lower risk of proliferation. The possible options
include the development of renewable energy resources, nuclear fuel as-
surances, and the establishment of multinational nuclear fuel centers.
1. Development of Renewable Energy Sources
One approach to the proliferation problem is to encourage the devel-
opment of alternatives to 'nuclear power, particularly in developing
countries that have indigenous sources of renewable energy.304 This
would require both financial support and technological assistance, per-
haps organized under the auspices of international or multinational
institutions.
The possibilities for non-nuclear energy development in the Third
World are enormous. Solar power, for example, is suitable for many
developing countries. 30 5 Hydroelectric power is also promising, as most
of the world's remaining hydroelectric capacity is located in South
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, 306 and very few of the available
sites are currently being utilized.307 Biomass conversion is another po-
tential energy source. 3° 1 The greatest photosynthetic production occurs
in areas where there is plenty of water and a continuous growing season,
such as the Amazon basin, equitorial Africa, and equitorial Southeast
Asia.309 In addition, belts of geothermal reservoirs exist along the west-
ern side of North and South America from Alaska to Chile, while other
304. Carter, Nuclear Energp and World Order, 18 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 148, 153 (1976).
305. Lovins, The Case for Long-Term Planng, 30 BULL ATOM. Sm. 38, 40 (June 1974);
Makhijani, Solar Energy and Rural Development for the Third World, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sdi. i4 (June
1976); but see Smil, Renewabl Energies: How Much and How Renewable?, 35 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 12 (Dec.
1979).
306. Lovins, supra note 305, at 38.
307. Martin & Pinto, Energyfor the Third World, 80 TEcH. REv. 48 (June/July 1978).
308. Poole & Williams, Flower Power Prospecasfor Photooithetic Energ, 32 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 48
(May 1976).
309. Calvin, Photosynthesis as a Resource for Energy and Matrials;, 64 AM. SCIENTiST 270 (1976);
Plants native to these areas, such as sugarcane, cassava, and pineapple, can be used to produce
alcohol or other fuel. Pollard, The Long Range Prospects for Solar-Dferued Fuels, 64 AM. ScIENTIsT 509,
511-12 (1976).
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reservoirs may be found in East Africa and along the volcanic "Circle of
Fire" that surrounds the Pacific Ocean.310 Finally, the ocean itself is a
potential energy source. The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion
(OTEC) concept, for example, utilizes the ocean's thermal gradient to
produce electricity. 31' The tropical regions within ten degrees of the
equator, comprising approximately 20 million square miles, offer the
most promising sites for OTEC facilities.312
If Third World countries can be induced to develop these energy
sources in place of nuclear power, they will no longer desire sensitive
nuclear technology. Of course, renewable energy sources probably will
never completely displace nuclear power in some developing countries.
In the first place, most of the foregoing "soft" energy alternatives involve
decentralized production of energy on a scale that may be appropriate
for small rural villages, but that is entirely unsuitable for large cities
such as Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, Singapore or Mexico City.3 1 3 Secondly,
as mentioned, mastery of complex technology is important in its own
right to the Third World. Thus, it may be very difficult to convince the
present group of near-nuclear countries to develop soft energy resources
even when these alternatives become more economical than nuclear
power. Many developing countries, however, have not yet made any
significant commitment to nuclear power. If they can be persuaded that
indigenous energy sources offer the prospect of energy security and tech-
nological challenge at substantially less cost than nuclear power, it may
be possible to prevent the emergence of another generation of near-nu-
clear countries in the Third World.
2. Nuclear Fuel Assurances
Another method of inducing countries to forego the acquisition of en-
richment and reprocessing facilities is by guaranteeing access to nuclear
fuel at reasonable prices. Such a policy would retain the existing once-
310. Barnes, Geothermal Power, 226 SCIENTIFIC AM. 70, 77 (Jan. 1972).
311. See Zener, Solar Sea Power, 32 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 17 (Jan. 1976); Whitmore, OTEC. Electric-
ity fom the Ocean, 81 TECH. REV. 58 (Oct. 1978).
312. Nanda, Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation (OTEC) Development Under US and International
Law and Institutlons, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 243-44 (1979).
313. "Soft" technologies have been defined as "diverse renewable sources that are relatively
simple from the user's point of view (though often technically very sophisticated) and that are
matched in scale and in energy quality to our range of end-use needs." Lovins, Soft Energy Technolo-
gies, 3 ANN. REV. ENERGY 477, 478 (1978). Such technologies are ideally suited for rural villages,
because they capitalize on poor countries' most abundant resources. Often they can be made lo-
cally from local materials and do not require a technical elite to maintain them. Lovins, Energy
Strategy. The Road Not Taken, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 65, 89 (1976); see generally A. LOvINS & J. PRICE,
NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1975).
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through or "throw away" nuclear fuel cycle and avoid the proliferation
problems inherent in fuel recycling.
Experts disagree whether existing uranium reserves are adequate to
sustain world-wide demand without fuel recycling.314 Although ura-
nium has been found in more than thirty countries,315 commercial grade
deposits are comparatively rare.316 Without fuel recycling, the rest of
the world, particularly the industrialized countries, would be totally de-
pendent on the small group of producers. 317  Fuel access assurances
would help overcome the fear of this dependence.
The United States has a reputation as an unreliable supplier. For
example, the United States failed to increase the capacity of its enrich-
ment plants when it began to supply "toll enrichment" services318 in the
late 1960's, and was unable to honor its commitments to other countries
when domestic demand for nuclear fuel increased. Instead, the United
States forced its customers to renegotiate their supply contracts at higher
prices and less favorable terms and even suspended shipments for six
months.3 19
Unilateral assurances of fuel supplies by the United States thus will
have little credibility abroad, but multinational arrangements may be
more promising. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act calls for the crea-
tion of an international fuel bank.3 20 Under the U.S. approach, partici-
pation in the bank would be limited to those countries that agreed to
314. Nininger, Uranium Resources - Are Thy Adequate?, 30 NUCLEAR TECH. 224 (1976).
315. Jacoby, Uranium Dependence and the Proferation Problem, 79 TECH. REv. 18, 20 (June 1977).
316. Estimated reserves total about 2.1 million short tons, with world production averaging
about 25-30,000 tons per year. Harris, World Uranium Resources, 4 ANN. REV. ENERGY 403, 405
(1979). Canada, South Africa and the United States account for more than 80 percent of the free
world's uranium production. ISSUES AND CHOICES, supra note 53, at 80. Nigeria, Gabon, Spain,
Portugal, and Argentina also export uranium. Id Large reserves exist in Australia, but that nation
has not decided whether to develop these resources for the export market. See Camilleri, Nuclear
Controvr.s in Australia: The Uranium Campaign, 35 BULL. ATOM. SCi. 40 (Apr. 1979).
317. Scheinman, Security and a Tranmational System, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
WORLD POLITICS 276, 287 (R. Keohane & J. Nye eds. 1972).
318. "Toll enrichment" means that the customer supplies his own yellowcake and is only
charged for the enrichment service itself. Conant & Kratzer, International Dimensions of Energy, 27
AM. U. L. REV. 559, 592 (1978). See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
319. The United States changed from flexible "requirements" contracts, in which the customer
purchased only as much fuel as it needed, to rigid "fixed commitment" contracts., Wolfe, Could
America's Nuclear Policies Be Counterproductive?, 36 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 43, 45 (Jan. 1980). Then, the
Atomic Energy Commission suspended all new contracts for future supplies of enriched uranium
and retroactively classified as "conditional," that is contingent on available capacity, contracts for
45 reactors scheduled to begin operation in the early 1980's. Franko, US Regulation of the Spread of
Nuclear Technologies Through Supplier Power. Leer or Boomerang?, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1181,
1188 (1978).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 3223 (Supp. 1979).
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full-scope safeguards.3 2' The concept of an internationally owned fuel
bank, perhaps with its own uranium enrichment plant, would encourage
many countries to defer construction of their own enrichment or
reprocessing plants. To encourage development of the fuel bank, the
obligations of the uranium suppliers should be explicitly stated and pref-
erably secured by treaty.
3. Multinational Fuel Centers,
If fuel recycling outside the United States is inevitable, multinational
fuel centers are a viable alternative to national plants and offer many
advantages over national facilities.322 A multinational fuel center would
take advantage of economies of scale 323 and by providing a share of
ownership and control to each participant, these centers would respond
to the political and symbolic concerns that would otherwise induce
countries to build national facilities.3 24 Finally, multinational facilities
can be designed to maximize the effectiveness of safequards and to sup-
plement conventional safeguards and physical security measures by
processing plutonium with methods that discourage hijacking or clan-
destine diversion. 325
Although multinational reprocessing and fuel fabrication centers may
offer hope for meeting the energy concerns of both industrialized and
developing countries and may reduce the proliferation risks of nation
fuel recycling programs, formidable barriers must be overcome before
multinational fuel centers can serve as viable alternatives to national
reprocessing plants. Before operations can commence, the participants
must agree on organizational structure, selection of the host country,
management policies, and pricing guidelines.
Commentators have suggested that multinational centers be organ-
ized on a corporate model3 26 characterized by independent manage-
ment and full capitalization. Independent nonpolitical management is
essential if security of supply is to be assured to all participants.3 27 Simi-
321. Marshall, Section 104 ofthe NudearNon-oiferation Actof1978-Establishmeni of International
Nutlear Supply Assurances, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 399, 415 (1979).
322. Ideally, such centers would include spent fuel storage facilities, a reprocessing plant, a fuel
fabrication plant and radioactive waste storage facilities. Futter, The Casefor Multinational Reproces-
sing Centers - Now, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 430 (1977).
323. Bloomfield, Nuc/ear Spread and World Order, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 743, 751 (1975).
324. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFE-
GAURDS 91-92 (1977).
325. See notes 283-302 supra and accompanying text.
326. See generally Smith & Chayes, Institutional Arrangementrfor a Multinational Reprocessing Plant,
in INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 145 (A. Chayes & W.B.
Lewis eds. 1977).
327. Id at 154-55.
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larly, a pool of capital is necessary so that the enterprise will not be
dependent on periodic contributions of participants. 328
The formal structure of the organization should be embodied in a
basic constitutive agreement, subscribed to by all parties. It should set
forth rules for the admission of new members and contain provisions
relating to the withdrawal or expulsion of participants.3 29 The agree-
ment also must include a description of the organization's decision mak-
ing organs and their powers, a declaration of the rights and obligations
of the parties, and a statement concerning the capital contribution re-
quirements of each participant.
The basic agreement should describe the fuel cycle services to be pro-
vided by the multinational center and specify the location of major fuel
service facilities, such as reprocessing plants. 33 0 Host countries would
have to be politically stable and technologically advanced. An industri-
alized country would be a preferable site because it would already have
the necessary technological expertise, but this might not be acceptable
to developing countries, particularly if they felt that the host country
could interrupt operations or delivery.3 3 1
The principal advantage of a multinational facility would be guaran-
teed access to reprocessed fuel. To ensure access, the participants would
need to agree on an allocation formula. One approach would be to give
each participant a claim on a specified portion of the annual production
of the plant. Another formula would give each country an absolute
right to all the plutonium recovered from its spent fuel. An arrange-
ment under which each participant gets back the same fuel it put in,
however, would not be consistent with the most efficient operation
procedure.
To avoid the accumulation of critical masses of plutonium during the
reprocessing cycle, spent fuel would have to be reprocessed in batches
rather than in one continuous flow. If spent fuel were reprocessed on the
basis of national batches, the plant would be underutilized some of the
time, thereby sacrificing some of the economies of scale.3 3 2 Instead, the
plant should reprocess spent fuel in economically sized batches even
when spent fuel from several countries must be mixed. Countries then
would receive the energy equivalent of the plutonium in new fuel.
Finally, the participants must determine what to charge for reproces-
sing services. Prices would affect security of supply and determine the
328. Id at 150.
329. Id at 152.
330. Id at 151.
331. Id at 165-66.
332. Id at 170.
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overall benefits from the enterprise. If the use of the facility were pro-
portionate to investment share, the pricing problem could be simplified
by charging each user a pro rata share of the operating costs. The pric-
ing policy necessarily would be more complex if capital contributions
among the participants did not correlate closely with use of the
facility. 333
Even if these difficulties were overcome, the establishment of multina-
tional fuel centers would not entirely eliminate the risk of nuclear
proliferation. Nevertheless, such an approach seems to offer an appro-
priate means of responding to the legitimate concerns of both industrial-
ized and developing countries without unnecessarily contributing to the
spread of nuclear weapons.
B. Responding to the Root Causes of Nuclear Proliferation
In the words of one commentator:
To hang nuclear power with the onus of proliferation when most proliferation
is likely to occur, and indeed has already occurred, via other pathways, is a bit
like looking for one's watch not where it was lost but under the lamppost where
the light is better.33
4
The mere fact that a country can gain the capability to produce nuclear
weapons from commercial nuclear power technology does not necessar-
ily mean that it will manufacture weapons. Unfortunately for many
countries, the incentives to go nuclear outweigh the disincentives. 335 In
all likelihood then, some countries can be expected to join the nuclear
club in the near future. 336 Consequently, America should search for
ways to reduce the inducements to develop nuclear weapons, thereby
hopefully preventing an uncontrollable spread of these weapons. The
non-proliferation policy of the United States should be adjusted to focus
on the causes of proliferation, rather than on the means by which nu-
clear weapons may be acquired.
Military security is one of the major reasons countries desire nuclear
weapons, even though the resulting strategic advantages may be only
temporary, 337 and even though such action, once known by adversaries,
may increase the risk of a local arms race338 or pre-emptive strike.339 To
333. Setid at 175.
334. Weinberg, Refections on the Energy Wars, 66 AM. Sci. 153, 156 (1978).
335. Kapur, Nth Powers ofthe Future, 430 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sct. 84,85 (March 1977).
336. Thayer, Proferathon and the Future: Destructtrn or Transfonmatin?, 430 ANNALS ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 133 (March 1977).
337. Delbruck, Mthtods of Furthering the World-Wide Acceptance of a Non-Prolferation Treaty, in
PUGWASH SYMPOSIUM, PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 180, 185 (C. Barnaby
ed. 1968).
338. Dunn, Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics, 430 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 96, 99-
100 (March 1977).
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prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States should
promote the development of multilateral arrangements that will offer
more long-term security than the weapons can provide. America's nu-
clear umbrella provides enough protection from possible Communist ag-
gression so that NATO allies and Japan do not feel a need to acquire
nuclear weapons to ensure their security. It is doubtful, however, that
the United States can make credible security guarantees in other parts
of the world, because it no longer has the military capability to act as
the world's policeman. Furthermore, neither world nor U.S. public
opinion would support American military intervention in a local con-
flict between two Third World countries. In addition, a military alli-
ance with the United States would violate the principle of nonalignment
to which most Third World countries subscribe.
Other forms of security guarantees may be more promising than for-
mal military alliances; these include affirmative commitments to assist
countries that are attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons and
negative assurances, which involve a pledge not to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapons countries. 34° Together negative and af-
firmative security guarantees are intended to reduce the military advan-
tages nuclear weapons give to a country when it is involved in a conflict
with a non-nuclear weapons country. As mentioned, a U.N. Security
Council resolution adopted in connection with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty currently provides for some affirmative security as-
surances.341 The current U.N. assurances are probably too weak to be
meaningful, but a treaty subscribed to by all, or most, of the nuclear
weapon states obligating them to provide substantial economic and mil-
itary assistance in the event of nuclear attack or blackmail would be
much more reliable.
Although affirmative and negative security assurances would be suffi-
cient to dissuade near-nuclear countries from developing their own nu-
clear weapon capabilities, they would not provide any protection
against attack by conventional military forces. Consequently, such se-
curity assurances would not reduce the possibility that countries, such as
339. Kaplan, TAe Nuclear Non-Proferaion Treaty: Its Rationale, Prospects and Possible Impact on In-
ternational Law, 18 J. PUB. L. 1, 4 (1969).
340. Epstein, Why States Go -And Don't Go -Nuclear, 430 ANNALS ACAD. PaL & Soc. Sci. 16,
20-21 (March 1977). See notes 169-74 supra and accompanying text.. Negative security assurances
are obligations by the nuclear weapons states themselves to refrain from using, or threatening to
use, nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. Bull, Rethinktg Non-Ptolferaton, 51
INT'L AFF. 175, 187-88 (1975).
341. See generally Lenefsky, Te United Nations Secunty Couwil Resolution on Security Assurances for
Non-Nuclear Weapon States, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 56 (1970).
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Israel, Pakistan or Taiwan, which risk being overwhelmed by superior
conventional forces, would acquire nuclear weapons.
The establishment of nuclear free zones also would reduce the likeli-
hood of a nuclear arms race in some parts of the world.342 Nuclear-free
zones already have been established for Antarctica, 343 Outer Space,344
and the seabed. 345 In addition, the Treaty of Tlateloco, 346 when ratified
by all Latin American countries, will create a nuclear free zone in Latin
America. 347 Nuclear free zones also have been proposed for Africa348
and the Middle East. 349
Military security, however, is not the sole reason that many countries
desire nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons in today's world
is a common way to achieve international status. As one commentator
declared: "It is the behavior pattern of the nuclear weapon power states,
and the legitimacy accorded by the international community to the use
of these weapons as a currency of power, that makes it advantageous for
those states with the potential to go nuclear to reserve their option. '350
With the world divided into nuclear haves and have-nots, developing
countries such as India, Argentina, and Brazil, which aspire to great
power status, see themselves relegated to a secondary role in world af-
fairs until they achieve nuclear weapons capabilities.
Two complementary approaches are necessary to prevent status con-
siderations from influencing the development of nuclear weapons. First,
it is necessary to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international
342. For a discussion of the concept of nuclear-free zones see Epstein, Nuclear Free Zones, 233
SCIENTIFIC AM. 25 (Nov. 1975).
343. The Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71.
344. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, dane Jan. 27, 1969, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
345. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb., 11,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
346. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 22 U.N. ENDC, U.N.
Doc. ENDC/186, 12-33 (1967); 22 U.N. A/C.1, U.N. Doc. A/C, 1/946 (1967).
347. The Treaty does not become effective until all of the Latin American countries ratify it.
So far, only Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba have failed to do so. See Redick, Regional Nuclear
Arms Control in Latin America, 29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 415 (1975); INTERNATIONAL ARMS CON-
TROL - ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 292-95 (J. Barton & L. Weiler eds. 1976); THE LAST CHANCE,
supra note 18, at 55-60.
348. Two United Nations General Assembly resolutions have called upon all countries to treat
Africa as a nuclear-free zone. G.A. Res. 1652, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 4, U.N. Doc. A/5 100
(1961); G.A. Res. 2033, 20 U.N. GAOR (Supp. 14) 9, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). There has been no
further progress with this proposal. This may be due in part to the South Africa problem. Com-
ment, Legal Implications of Indian Nuclear iXrvelopment, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL, 237, 242 (1974).
349. Epstein, Nuclear-Free Zones, 233 SCIENrIFIC AM. 25, 31-32 (Nov. 1975).
350. Security, supra note 269, at 18.
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relations, 351 and second, a world order must be established in which na-
tions can achieve status and economic well-being by nonmilitary means.
Strategic arms limitation agreements and "no first use" pledges are
two methods of reducing the utility of nuclear weapons as instruments
of foreign policy. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which obligates the nuclear weapons nations to take steps toward dis-
armament, affirms the view of many developing countries that lateral
and vertical proliferation issues352 are necessarily linked together. 353
The successful negotiation of the SALT agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union, therefore, would discourage the spread of
nuclear weapons in the Third World.
A "no first use pledge" would restrict nuclear weapons to defensive or
retaliatory uses and thus would reduce their utility as a bargaining tool
in the diplomatic arena. 354 The renunciation of nuclear weapons for of-
fensive purposes could take the form of a unilateral declaration or a
collective agreement. Both the Soviet Union and China have advocated
a "no first use" pledge, but the United States has opposed it, primarily
because such a pledge would leave NATO allies vulnerable to a conven-
tional attack by the numerically superior Soviet military forces. 35 5
De-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs, however,
will not solve the proliferation, unless other avenues are provided for
developing countries to achieve power, status, and economic well-be-
ing.356 Such a de-emphasis requires the evolution of a world order that
reflects a significant redistribution of both power and material re-
sources. 357 In the long run, the United States cannot hope to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons unless such changes occur. Therefore,
America's long-range non-proliferation policy must recognize that par-
ticipation by Third World countries in commercial nuclear energy de-
velopments may help them to realize their economic potential and
satisfy the aspirations of their citizens for dignity and material prosper-
ity without the need for nuclear weapons.
351. Nye, Prolferatlir A Long-Term Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 620 (1978).
352. Vertical proliferation refers to the increase of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapons
countries. Fisher, Global Dimension, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 3, 5
(B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
353. Barkenbus, Whither the Treafy?, 36 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 37, 38 (Apr. 1980). See note 210
supra.
354. Falk, Renumwmton ofNudear Weapons Use, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR
CONTROL 133, 133 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich eds. 1970).
355. Ullman, No First Use of Nuclear Weapom, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 669 (1972).
356. Nye, Prolifratiwt A Long-Term Stratlegy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601, 603 (1978).
357. Falk, NucAlar Wapozr Proiferation as a World Order AP/em, I INT'L SECURITY 79, 82 (Win-
ter 1977).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Nuclear technology, with its potential for both constructive and de-
structive uses, is out of the bottle. Implementing America's present non-
proliferation policy, with its emphasis on restricting sensitive nuclear
technology, is analogous to putting the genie back into the bottle. But
unlike the story, no amount of cleverness can ever accomplish this task.
The greatest risk of nuclear proliferation does not come from properly
safeguarded commercial nuclear facilities, but from dedicated facilities.
Unless a way can be found to deal with both the dedicated facility
proliferation pathway and the root causes of nuclear proliferation, the
prospects of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons are poor. Ac-
cordingly, the United States, in cooperation with other concerned na-
tions, should direct its efforts toward encouraging the acceptance of
norms of international behavior that minimize the acceptability of nu-
clear weapons. At the same time, the United States should search for
peaceful means by which developing countries can improve their posi-
tion in the world. It is only through reasoned and planned international
cooperation that an effective non-proliferation strategy can be
implemented.
[Vol. 16
